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Massive privatizations of housing in Europe and Central Asia transition 
countries have significantly reduced rental tenure choice, threatening to 
impede residential mobility. Policymakers are intensifying their search 
for adequate policy responses aimed at broadening tenure choice for 
more household categories through effective rental housing alternatives 
in the social and private sectors. While the social alternative requires 
substantial and well-balanced subsidies, the private alternative will not 
grow unless rent, management, and tax reforms are boldly implemented 
and housing privatization truly completed. 
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This study reviews the post-privatization rental housing challenges confronted by six transition 
countries in the Europe and Central Asia region: Armenia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia 
and Serbia. The common problem for policy makers across these countries is that housing 
privatizations decimated the stock of social housing, while the growing market-based housing 
production has been almost entirely focused on homeownership. As the number of households 
who did not benefit from the privatization continues to grow – especially the young, the mobile 
and the poor – the lack of accessible and affordable formal rental housing is pushing them into 
informal rentals with little tenure security, discouraging higher residential mobility and thus 
labor market flexibility. Governments are increasingly recognizing that sustainable 
homeownership for all is neither financially and fiscally possible, nor desirable for all household 
groups and life-cycle stages. Consequently, there is a need for post-privatization housing policies 
to recognize and address the need for social, non-profit and market-based rental housing choice. 
 
In order to respond to this growing policy gap, the Bank has undertaken an extensive literature 
review. That desk study has been supplemented by limited field work. The study offers 
preliminary recommendations regarding the directions of policy response aimed at creating 
better choice of rental tenure by households who cannot attain homeownership and by those who 
consciously opt for this tenure form. We hope that this study will contribute to the growing 









This study tests empirically the key hypothesis that households in the Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA) region lack access to efficient rental housing. This hits especially the young and mobile, 
as well as the poor and the elderly. Domestic policy makers, who are increasingly talking about 
the need for rental housing choice, should consider realigning their housing policies and start 
enabling and promoting a competitive and efficient formal rental market.  
To test the key hypothesis, given the considerable resource constraints for this study, a six-
country sample was used to reflect different housing sectors and housing reform environments—
Armenia, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Serbia (without Montenegro). 
The study used disaggregated household datasets, other available statistical and survey evidence, 
and interviews to arrive at an empirical picture of the rental sector in those countries and test the 
null hypothesis. The study also considered investor types and legal, regulatory and taxation 
issues that prevent swifter rental sector development.  
Main Empirical Findings 
Rental supply in housing sectors in the ECA region is smaller than expected in mature market 
economies with similar patterns of demographics, incomes, mobility needs, and building 
inventory.  
This is especially so in Armenia, Romania, and Serbia where the formal rental sector is a barely 
traceable residual. In Russia, the rental sector is significant, but only because it consists primarily 
of social (municipal) rental housing slated for eventual privatization. In Lithuania, social 
(municipal) rental housing has been decimated, but there is a lively, mostly informal, private 
rental market in individual apartments. In Poland, the significant rental sector includes formally 
restituted prewar rental apartment buildings, and cooperative rental apartment stock, as well as 
the “regular” social (municipal) rental apartment stock.  
There is also evidence of a large shadow rental sector that survived the privatization wave. With 
the notable exception of Poland, in the broadly defined apartment sector, ownership titles to 
common property in multifamily (M-F) buildings and surrounding grounds are lacking. Such 
facilities continue to be serviced and maintained mostly by public sector companies typically 
owned by municipalities. It points to an important side effect of the mass privatization: 
significant unintended inefficiencies. The privatizations mostly failed to produce either genuine 
homeowners or professional rental investors willing and able to undertake maintenance and 
capital repairs on common property in the multifamily buildings dominating ECA urban areas.  
The correlation between building type and tenure form is a crude measure - but the closest 
available - of housing choice in mature market economies. The preponderance of M-F buildings 
in the housing stock of ECA countries suggests a much higher incidence of rental tenure than is 
the case, given that rental form is the easiest for managing such buildings. The incidence should iv 
be between 20 percent in Serbia and 40–50 percent in Poland and Russia, but none of the studied 
countries comes anywhere close to that range (Figure 1). 
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Source: World Bank LSMS study, Lithuanian Household Survey, national statistical offices.  
Note: For the Czech Republic and Slovakia all units in housing cooperatives were counted as non-owner-occupied 
because of the lack of detailed data on renting. 
Demand for private rental is rather strong among its typical household groups - the young and 
mobile - consistent with patterns found in mature market economies. Higher incomes of many 
younger households, typically the winners in economic transition, drive up private sector formal 
and informal rents in the most attractive cities. However, the lack of a consistent investment 
framework for formal private rental housing accommodates elastic expansion of supply, 
discouraging additional migration from smaller cities and rural areas. Consequently, the 
restricted rental tenure choice is likely to compromise macroeconomic performance in the 
studied countries, and by inference in the other ECA transition countries.  
Residual social rental housing, decimated by the mass privatization, cannot accommodate the 
newly created post-privatization households who are poor, let alone the young and mobile, to any 
meaningful degree. Occupancy of the social housing stock in these countries is dominated by the 
previously allocated tenants and thus lacks socioeconomic targeting for the current dynamic 
situation. In the few cases where the sector has not been marginalized, highly subsidized rents 
effectively lock sitting tenants into their dwellings, preventing any significant adjustment, 
restructuring and reallocation within this stock. Inadequate public resources and programs 
maintain the weak supply responsiveness in the existing social housing. 
With regard to the price impact of these apparent imbalances between demand and supply, the 
studied countries fall in three groups:  v 
1.  The most advanced transition (and EU accession) countries of Lithuania and Poland 
experience strong demand pressure for renting and keep somewhat responsive supply, which 
mitigates the upward pressure on private rents.  
2.  The advanced transition countries of Romania and Russia experience high demand pressure 
for rental apartments, coinciding with a pronounced scarcity of rental housing supply and 
resultant very high private informal rents.   
3.  The least advanced post-conflict countries of Armenia and Serbia experience relatively 
subdued demand for housing in general, including rental housing. 
Rents in all jurisdictions continue to be set at regulated, non-market-clearing levels, constraining 
both public and private rental stock. These first-generation “hard” rent controls contravene the 
main thrust of pivotal market and property rights reforms and are the result of holding the rental 
sector captive by populist rhetoric. 
The empirical findings support the key hypothesis of broadly insufficient rental housing choice 
of households, although the general economic situations and varying policy frameworks 
differentiates specific results for countries, regions and localities.  
Main Findings of the Policy Review 
Progress in legal and regulatory reform of rental housing has been slow. Rent reforms face strong 
political resistance from privatized tenant-owners and from social tenants, both groups benefiting 
from the low maintenance costs and controlled rents maintained by public providers and 
regulators. 
In most studied countries the private rental sector is informal and undocumented because of the 
ease of tax evasion and the imposition of hard rent controls. Institutional or other professional 
investors in rental housing are found only in isolated cases. Poland is the most advanced in 
enabling private rental investment through tax and fiscal support; for example, individual 
investors act as co-financers of new non-profit rental housing or as owners of restituted prewar 
rental buildings
1. However, legal and rent control issues remain largely unresolved despite 
considerable recent progress. Lithuania has also taken steps toward formalization by improving 
the tax environment, and Russia has started to improve rental laws in formal social housing. Still, 
none of the studied countries has an effective dispute resolution and eviction system. Tax 
regimes also discourage private investing in rental housing, except to a degree in Poland. 
All studied countries except Serbia and Armenia recently began supporting social rental housing 
construction, in response to the growing frustration over sagging construction activity and 
growing numbers of “social” households. However, the programs are generally small and heavily 
subsidized, and thus unable to resolve the housing problems of the poor. Except in isolated urban 
areas (Moscow, Bucharest), there is no general strategy of using moderately priced existing units 
for social rental and thus enhancing program outreach. The public rental sector also suffers from 
                                                 
1 Non-profit rental housing system TBS requires that tenants participate in construction cost, see p. 50. vi 
low rent setting and inadequate regulation. Only Poland has expanded the concept of social 
housing, by supporting public-private non-profit rental housing, and retained the form of 
cooperative (and thus also non-profit) tenant apartments.  
Recommendations to the Studied Countries 
Governments should formulate more explicit rental housing policies and implement the requisite 
programs as part of the post-privatization realignment of their housing policies. Rental choice 
policies should be seen as vital life-cycle and poverty-focused complements to homeownership 
policies, not as mere residual and temporary measures.  
Governments should consider anchoring their rental housing policies on a competitive, private, 
formalized rental sector, supplemented only by well targeted social rental housing programs. 
Greater private resources should be mobilized into the rental sector through programs aimed at 
developing the private market, public-private partnerships (PPPs), and non-profit sectors. 
Reliance on the private rental sector requires abolishing hard rent controls as well as developing 
transparent and balanced landlord-tenant regulations, including dispute resolution and eviction 
procedures; securing sufficient competition to prevent usurious rent seeking; further developing 
fledgling housing allowance systems; and enacting tax regulations that assure tenure-neutral 
treatment of housing sector investors.  
Some governments are interested in fostering a non-profit rental housing sector to address 
housing affordability problems of middle-income and lower-middle income households, those 
who are “too poor” to afford (even subsidized) homeownership and who are “too rich” to quality 
for social housing or housing allowances. Only Poland has a state-sponsored program in this 
area, but its experience should be examined in depth to bring out lessons and possible 
modifications for other countries. 
Whatever the ultimate policy design, public housing budgets in the studied countries are far too 
small to comprehensively resolve the problems of the rental sector through subsidies. There are 
two directions for engaging public efforts and expenditures: create incentives for larger private 
sector involvement in market-driven or PPP non-profit rental investments and operations; and 
create a small but sustainable—and hence manageable—social housing sector.  
Housing policy needs regular monitoring, evaluation, and review. The current political 
architecture in many ECA countries is often not conducive to independent reviews that question 
the efficiency and goal attainment of policies. Too few resources are devoted to public 
communication, data monitoring, and managerial, analytical, and comparative work. This raises 
the risk of costly misallocations of scarce public resources and calls for building explicit 
institutionalized mechanisms for both central and local governments. vii 
Need for Further Research 
The findings of this study suggest a need for more comprehensive ECA region-wide policy and 
empirical research focused on rental tenure choice and sector, so that a full comparative 
understanding can be compiled including actual practice cases of various policies, programs, and 
instruments for others to learn about, discuss, and possibly adapt to their own countries. 
Regardless of the number of countries covered, there is a need for follow-up research on both 
empirical and policy themes.  
In empirical research there is a need for institutionalized monitoring of the rental sector, through 
improved census work and housing sector reporting, and supplementary specialized surveys on 
rental housing at various levels of government.
2 For tenure policy research two themes are 
relevant: (i) detailed analysis of country rental housing policy frameworks; and (ii) cross-country 
comparative policy studies to deepen understanding of actual practice. There is also a need for 
better understanding of the impact and constraints of specific policy measures and programs. 
Analogies from other sectors could broaden the feasible policy menu. This should include 
alternative taxation models and regulatory incentives or impediments. 
Linkages to broader economic issues should include the role in poverty alleviation and labor 
mobility strategies of the public sector acting as a rental housing investor providing “market 
additionality”, while not replacing the formal private rental market. Partly due to political and 
ideological inclination toward homeownership, research into new public investment strategies in 
the form of rental PPPs, or non-profit rental forms has almost subsided over the recent decades, 
so there is a need to resume research in these directions. 
The issue of inter- and intra-governmental housing policy institutional architecture should be 
studied to improve understanding of where housing policy is formulated and implemented. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests a wide variety of institutional anchors for housing policy both 
within central governments and between central, regional, and local government levels. The 
institutional fragmentation of housing policy formulation and implementation has discouraged 
development of comprehensive and cohesive housing strategy in many countries. Realignment of 
institutional infrastructure towards stronger coordination should be investigated. 
 
                                                 
2  See Annex 2 for an outline of survey contents assuring consistency.  1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Background and Setting 
After the Soviet economic system breakdown during 1989–91, rapid privatization of housing to 
sitting tenants became a pillar of fledgling housing reforms, intended to establish the vested 
interests of the majority of population against possible reversals of the overall processes of 
economic reform and democracy building. Decentralization of most social policy competencies 
to regional and local governments supported the thrust to build an ownership society immune to 
communist ideology. 
However, the broad expectations that housing sector “micro” privatization would lead to higher 
investment and asset management efficiency was not realized in respect to multi-family (M-F) 
buildings that continue to dominate the housing stock. First, after governments withdrew from 
direct provision of housing through new construction, housing production figures plummeted 
throughout the ECA region. The major turnaround came only recently, 10–12 years after the 
inception of the reforms, and the region still lags behind others with comparable housing needs 
and income levels. Second, a thorough modernization of the M-F building stock—already a 
major issue in the early 1990s - became ineffective under the new privatized ownership 
structures, which left common property components of this stock without incentives for 
responsible decision makers for building management and hence, investors.  Third, formally 
turning tenants into owners did not change the inherited social and cultural mentality that 
housing is a merit good. Perception was grounded continued that the jointly owned common 
areas of M-F buildings and surrounding grounds were in fact “extensions of the street”, and thus 
should be maintained and repaired by municipalities, so that apartment owners and tenants 
should continue making low nominal payments on top of their own utility bills.  
The high nominal homeownership rates achieved through mass privatization of the above type 
had profound implications for housing demand. The marginalized rental sector severely 
constrained the development of competitive, market-based tenure choice options that could be 
exercised by economically diverse households according to their income profiles, family and job 
situations, and personal preferences. Small-scale, often informal, yet spontaneous private rental 
activities began soon after and some new public rental housing was built on a very limited scale.  
But the rental sector as a whole - a strategically important sub-sector catering to important 
household groups - has become an overlooked residual of the privatization driven reforms.
3  
Soon after the “give-away” privatization of apartments was mostly completed an increasing 
number of experts and policy makers in transition economies began to realized that reforms 
based on privatization only were grossly unfinished and incomplete, lagging other sectors and 
inspiring the saying “neither Marx nor market” (World Bank 2001). Presently, many 
governments in the region are attempting to pull diverse housing-related reforms into more 
                                                 
3   The UN Habitat (2003) rental housing report states bluntly that “Few governments have taken rental housing 
seriously over the past thirty years” and discusses the reasons for this neglect. Furthermore it states: 
“Unfortunately, little has actually happened, and recognition of the important role played by the rental sector 
still constitutes perhaps the greatest hole in most national housing policies.” 2 
comprehensive and cohesive strategies focused on availability of housing choice to segmented 
household groups rather than the traditional Soviet-period focus on the quantity and quality of 
the housing stock. This paradigm shift has led policy makers to discover the “rental gap” and 
made them request policy dialogue with the Bank on these issues.
4 
Purpose of the Study 
In the post-privatization “soul searching” in the housing policy arena, growing numbers of policy 
makers in transition countries are searching for measures to secure broader availability of rental 
tenure choice and greater dynamics of modernization and new construction through a more 
significant and efficient rental sector. To this end they seek a housing policy dialogue broader 
than homeownership and look for access to analytical assistance and a knowledge base in rental 
housing area. This study is seen as an attempt to meet this growing need by compiling and 
developing further the insufficient knowledge base in this area. 
The over-arching purpose of the study is then to help develop the housing reforms knowledge 
base -both conceptual and empirical - in rental tenure choice, so that to respond to the needs for 
policy dialogue with transition countries. Such a dialogue calls now for engagement in issues 
well beyond homeownership and privatization, and towards formulation of comprehensive 
housing strategies addressing the key political issue of housing choice for all household types in 
terms of dwelling type, standard, location, and tenure form. The focus on development of rental 
housing sectors, the subject of this study, should contribute to development of such 
comprehensive housing strategies. 
Objective and Key Hypothesis 
The objective of the study is to better understand urban housing rental tenure choice for diverse 
household categories and segments in the transition economies. The main question is this: Is 
urban housing rental tenure choice sufficient, and have governments adequately considered and 
handled this issue in their policy making?  
The key hypothesis is then formulated as follows: ECA households lack required rental housing 
choice in an efficient rental sector; consequently governments need to realign their weak and 
ineffective rental housing policies. 
This hypothesis reflects the belief that the ECA countries, through their early enthusiasm for 
homeownership and privatization, have not paid sufficient attention to rental housing choice of 
households that need to adjust their housing “consumption.” And some may have waited too 
long with addressing this issue. Their policies on rental housing, if articulated at all, have been 
weak and ineffective, focused on subsidizing the replenishment of social housing, rather then 
enabling and encouraging the growth of a robust formalized private rental sector. As a result of 
the mass privatization, the failed rent reforms, and the lack of rental housing policy, many 
households that did not benefit from privatization now face severely constrained tenure choice.  
                                                 
4    Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania have been in informal dialogue with the Bank over rental tenure choice 
issues. 3 
Methodology  
Due to resource limitations, this study is necessarily a rapid exploratory assessment. Six 
countries form a sample representative of different stages of housing sector and policy 
development (Armenia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Serbia).
5 For this group the 
study is the first in-depth tenure structure analysis with disaggregate household data using the 
Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) and annual Household Budget Surveys (HBS). 
These data are enhanced by other evidence from national statistics, analysts’ reports and 
findings,
6 and interviews with experts and market participants in all six countries. The review of 
policies and best practice relies on interviews and selective analysis of legislative and regulatory 
texts. More in-depth analysis is both desirable and possible, but the form of analysis used in the 
study provides sufficient insight to support, or reject, the key hypothesis. 
Organization of the Report 
Chapter 2 discusses conceptual considerations about what determines rental sector size in a 
market economy and the basic drivers of rental demand and supply found in the literature. It also 
briefly addresses the implications of the existence of rental sectors for economic efficiency, and 
rationales for policy interventions designed to support or create efficiency.
7  
Chapter 3 provides a basis for supporting or rejecting the key hypothesis. It identifies supply and 
demand structures that correspond with the conceptual framework and main issues identified in 
Chapter 2.  
Chapter 4 deals with actual tenure choice policies in the studied countries in three ways:  
  First, by analyzing existing investor types and the extent to which they pursue formal or 
informal market practices, and how their basic business models are structured.  
  Second, by identifying gaps in the legal and regulatory frameworks governing rental 
contracts and tenant-landlord relations, then analyzing the tax environment. 
  Third, by discussing the broader housing policy context of tenure choice policies in the 
studied countries, giving specific attention to the privatization, “communalization,” and 
restitution processes, as well as to the current strategies of retaining and redeveloping a 
social housing sector. 
                                                 
5   Countries represent various groups: Armenia, small post-Soviet countries; Lithuania, small EU accession 
countries; Poland, large EU accession countries; Romania, medium EU pre-accession countries; Russia, its own 
category; Serbia, postconflict southeastern Europe. 
6   The LSMS and HBS are administered by the statistical agencies within each country with technical assistance 
from donor organizations. In Russia a one-time survey, the NOBUS, was used. This survey, administered by the 
statistical authorities, was intended to improve on the questionnaire design of the annual HBS.   
7   For more detailed discussions of available theories and evidence see Annex 1. 4 
Chapter 5 concludes whether the key hypothesis is supported by the gathered and analyzed 
evidence. Further research needs to strengthen the findings and enhance the knowledge base are 
outlined. Recommendations to policy makers interested in broadening housing choice by 
expanding rental tenure availability are offered. 
The annexes contain: (1) a review of relevant literature; and (2) a possible outline for rental 
housing surveys to support informed policy debate and intervention design.  5 
2.  CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Determinants of Tenure Patterns 
The literature review (Annex 1) reveals that no convincing equilibrium theory of housing supply 
and demand yields reliable predictions about optimum homeownership levels, and conversely 
optimum rental sector size. Ideological and partially analytic approaches dominate the literature; 
most are embedded in simple microeconomic models that by definition lack the structure to 
sufficiently explain the wide data variability observed. Rental sector size in Europe alone varies 
across countries between 3 percent and 55 percent of the number of housing units. 
The most widely used class of models focuses on the demand side. The literature on tenure 
choice focuses on the household’s utility maximization arising from its housing investment or 
consumption decision for or against homeownership or rental. In the typical model, such a 
decision is usually influenced by household income, age or stage in the life cycle, and a range of 
specific household characteristics such as family status (single or married), number of children, 
and professional status. Given the shortcomings of this class of models, extended versions 
consider that the household can finance a higher housing consumption level by borrowing on the 
financial markets. Also, fiscal support schemes that enhance demand for rental or for 
homeownership (housing allowances, low-interest loans, capital grants for homeowners) are 
considered (see Annex 1). 
Who Tends to Rent? 
The tenure choice literature indicates several rather reliable predictions, which are grounded in 
the empirical literature. It suggests that the likelihood of a household opting for rental tenure 
tends to: 
  Decrease with household income levels and age; however, it may increase during 
retirement because of life-cycle consumption considerations
8 
  Increase with income uncertainty, individual search activity for jobs, divorce incidence, 
and need for mobility 
  Decrease with household size, importantly influenced by household type
9  
  Decrease - at least in younger age groups - with improved access to mortgage loans with 
low down-payment requirements 
  Decrease with an increase in the ratio of mortgage market subsidies relative to 
comparable rental demand subsidies  
                                                 
8   Depending also on such factors as inheritance taxes and the strength of individual motivation to bequeath 
property. 
9   Single, couple with no kids, families, etc. 6 
  Decrease with an increase in the relative risk-adjusted return of housing investments to 
other investments 
  Decrease with an increase in the propensity of a household to save.
10 
In the empirical literature, cultural factors are sometimes identified as significant determinants of 
homeownership preferences that are hard to capture in economic models. Examples are the depth 
of religious and family values and broader social preferences for or against community 
ownership. 
Unfortunately, the tenure choice theories invariably treat rental housing supply conditions as 
given, which seems grossly inadequate even after cursory inspection of the data. Consider that 
the share of M-F apartment buildings in mature market economies—with similar income 
distributions, household characteristics and access to finance—closely correlates with the size of 
the rental sector (Figure 2). This is hard to reconcile with standard predictions made by the 
tenure choice theories, for which supply structure is irrelevant. In contrast to the relatively well 
developed demand-side theories, the supply conditions that influence tenure choice in 
equilibrium are surprisingly under-researched. For example, after adjusting for demand 
determinants, larger cities typically have significantly larger rental sector shares than smaller 
cities; why? And neighborhoods within cities are known to compete,
11 resulting in some being 
predominantly rentals and others predominantly owner-occupied. However, a new generation of 
spatial economic theories should is likely to contribute to the necessary theoretical development 
(Tirole 1990; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999). 
A second strand of supply-side theory, subsumed in the Theory of the Firm, may help explore the 
effect of complex ownership structures. Complexity in decision making (for example, about 
modernizing common areas including building envelope and surrounding grounds, and 
coordinating costs among apartment owners) prevents higher penetration of M-F housing stock 
with condominiums or cooperatives. Empirically, those do not exceed 5–10 percent of the M-F 
housing stock, even in mature markets. However, true privatization of M-F apartments requires 
functional collective decision making and coordination in respect of jointly owned common 
property.  
The Theory of the Firm also deals with determinants of optimum firm size in different industries: 
under which conditions, for instance, do small private landlords emerge as suppliers of the rental 
“product”? Under which conditions do large institutional investors supply the rental product? 
Strikingly, even in countries with developed mortgage markets supported by few large banking 
firms, the typical residential rental landlord is very small. This holds event though both types of 
landlord firms in essence provide the same financial intermediation service, namely financing 
long-term assets. Does the prevalence of small rental landlords reflect artificial market barriers 
                                                 
10   Which in turn correlates with income and other characteristics as well as such macroeconomic factors as the 
type of retirement system. 
11   Such competition must be considered imperfect, given that land is not tradable—which could be addressed by 
applying monopolistic competition theory. 7 
for larger and more efficient firms, or are they efficient as a reflection of the problems of 
information flow and control span that prohibit larger firms from entering? If artificial barriers 
exist, what exactly does it take to encourage the emergence of large investors or “servicers” in 
the rental market that could drive down rents or enhance service quality? 
Social choice theories may also help in understanding the supply side of renting. Why do some 
mature market countries maintain extensive social rental housing programs (as in The 
Netherlands), while the programs of their immediate and culturally close neighbors are much 
more modest (as in Belgium)? This situation may arise from preferences of the median voter, 
who in The Netherlands is a renter and in Belgium is an owner. Social choice could help explain 
the preponderance of social renting in transition countries before 1989. The dismal housing 
situation of the working class was a major issue in the revolutions of the early twentieth century 
that produced Soviet socialism. But it may also explain the inertia in dealing with many of the 
current housing policy problems in the region. For example, the median voter in ECA transition 
countries is a former renter turned owner (tenant-owner) in a M-F building privatized almost for 
free (give-away privatization). The median voter in the United Kingdom or United States is an 
owner who bought a housing asset on the market through considerable effort that continues over 
the term of mortgage loan repayment. And homeownership in some countries focuses mostly on 
homes rather than apartments, which does not have to deal with a difficult issue of jointly-owned 
common-property management, maintenance and repairs. In other countries, where apartment 
ownership is more significant, this issue gains more importance and affects the way M-F 
buildings are owned and managed. Not surprisingly, housing policies and instruments differ in 
societies with such fundamentally different experiences and political economies. These widely 
differing circumstances have contributed to communication problems in comparative housing 
policy research and debate. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using National Agency for Enterprise and Housing (Denmark): Housing Statistics in 
the European Union (2003), UN-ECE (2004a), Joint Centre of Housing Studies (2004).  8 
The application of the “emerging” theories to housing and particularly to tenure issues belongs to 
a work program of the future, and is beyond the scope of this study. However, there are two 
relevant bodies of literature dealing with rental housing supply within a rudimentary equilibrium 
theory approach: (i) on the theory of rent control; and (ii) on the theory of residential filtering 
process. 
Rent control and its distorting effects, including politics, populism and implications for housing 
market equilibria, have been extensively researched. The literature survey (Annex 1) gives an 
overview of these issues. The economists’ verdict against first-generation “hard” rent controls 
and ceilings is universal; however, more indirect, softer forms of second-generation rent controls 
that cap only usurious (short-term monopolistic) practices have been found to exercise a 
demand-stabilizing effect. Again, the theories are not sufficiently rich in structure to explain 
partly diverse empirical outcomes. 
The theory of residential filtering (trickle-down) seems more useful, so far. Consider several sub-
markets of the housing sector that compete for consumers. Consumers gain in housing 
consumption capacity over their life cycle and face financial and transaction cost hurdles when 
trying to realize their perpetual desire to upgrade their housing status.
12 Filtering assumes not 
only that households change submarkets over their life cycles, but also that supply changes too, 
as older units filter down in the rent hierarchy, until they are modernized or exit the market 
through dilapidation and demolition.  No rigorous specification of this model with modern 
economic theory tools is known to us; however, its rich structure has the potential to integrate 
both complex supply and tenure choice elements in a consistent equilibrium theory. As discussed 
later (Annex 1) in more detail, numerous conclusions can be drawn for tenure policies and need 
to be researched further. The most important one is that price controls or subsidies in a specific 
sub-market may impede the entire filtering chain, leading to a decline in overall housing 
investment. 
Summarizing the small body of applicable supply-side literature, one may predict that 
households tending to be renters will: 
  Decrease as land prices decline, allowing for lower urban densities and less complex 
building structures 
  Increase with economic agglomeration effects 
  Increase with inter-urban and inter-regional changes in economic dynamics and city 
hierarchy, which warrant higher labor mobility 
  Increase with complexity of the housing production and management structures, which 
raise the costs of individual homeownership 
  Increase with efficiency of the servicing of rental contracts, which in turn depends on 
local conditions for optimum firm size for landlords 
                                                 
12   For example, from living with parents to subletting, from subletting to renting, from renting to owning a small 
house, from owning a small house to owning a large house. 9 
  Increase with the level of legal and regulatory property transaction costs, which raise the 
costs of homeownership 
  Decrease in societies where the median voter is a homeowner, which is likely to 
introduce a bias in housing policy programs in favor of owning 
  Decrease with the level of “hard” rent controls, such as fixed rent ceilings, typical for 
first-generation rent-setting policies 
  Increase with the amount of units filtering down to uses affordable by household types 
predicted to be renters under demand-side utility maximization. 
Can all these partial hypotheses concerning demand and supply aspects of tenure choice be 
condensed to arrive at a single measure that indicates the equilibrium likelihood of renting, and - 
aggregating over households - the equilibrium share of the rental sector?  Obviously, such a 
theory does not yet exist, let alone empirical testing methodologies. The issue has been 
dominated by ideologically inspired paradigms of homeownership’s positive externalities on the 
one hand, and “nation of homeowners” political economy arguments on the other hand. 




































Source: Chiuri and Jappelli (2000). 10 
In this respect two robust empirical results should be noted. First, there is an apparent correlation 
between building and tenure structures (Figure 2).
13 This suggests that there could be a supply-
induced inertia when attempting to increase the share of owner-occupied units in jurisdictions 
with large M-F stock that was designed and produced for rental. This issue is a central point in 
the discussion below regarding transition countries. Second, as Chiuri and Jappelli (2000) have 
shown, homeownership rates at retirement age are far less variable across (European) countries 
than rates at the age of 20 or 30.
14 This indicates the paramount importance of low-cost, low-risk 
access to housing services during the third stage of the life cycle, as well as the pivotal function 
of real estate ownership in diversifying retirement asset portfolios. And vice versa, there is less 
of a need for tenure security and portfolio diversification in the earlier stages of the life cycle 
(Figure 3).  
Tenure Pattern and Economic Efficiency 
One may also consider a reverse causality: Will the existence of a rental sector in equilibrium 
facilitate economic efficiency? Two candidate factors are of particular interest for higher 
efficiency: (i) labor market; and (ii) land / housing market. 
The popular notion that homeowners are less likely to move than tenants is well grounded in the 
literature pointing out the virtues of this to community stability, social attitudes etc. The degree 
to which higher homeownership contributes to labor market imbalances is somewhat less studied 
and clear. It should decrease or increase with the amount of compensating subsidies; for 
example, through regional policies (investment support, infrastructure projects). However, a 
stand-alone impact of high ownership rates, particularly by young households, is quite plausible.  
And vice versa, economies with small rental sectors are expected to face increased migration 
costs and thereby a reduced elasticity of the labor supply relative to spatial wage differences. The 
reason is that migrants, at least initially, face job tenure and income insecurities and thus seek to 
reduce housing search and transaction costs, which are lower in the rental sector. Analysis for the 
United States shows that because of these factors two-thirds of migrating homeowners become 
tenants first (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2003).  
A recent report on rental housing by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-
Habitat) (2003) makes the point that there may be an inverse relationship between 
unemployment and homeownership.
15 This supports our contention that high levels of 
homeownership reduce residential and hence labor mobility, which is better served by rental 
housing - especially in transition countries. The role of the housing market in labor mobility is to 
                                                 
13   The two outliers, The Netherlands and Spain, can be partly explained by policy peculiarities. The Netherlands 
has traditionally emphasized social rental, which includes detached housing. The Spanish rental sector, on the 
other extreme, has been depressed by decades of rent control. Eastaway and Varo (2002) discuss the Spanish 
case. 
14   In their survey of 13 countries, ownership rates at ages 50–59 vary 53 - 82% while at ages 30–39 they vary 33 - 
70% and at ages 25–29 they vary 11 - 59%. 
15   The cited study estimated that a 10 percentage point increase in homeownership could be equated with an extra 
2.2 percentage points of unemployment.  11 
be studied by the Bank in upcoming economic and sector work.
16 With similar arguments, the 
absence of a rental sector of a minimum size may impair housing sector and urban development. 
This is not well researched, but it seems plausible that cities in jurisdictions with constraints 
imposed on rental supply - such as rent controls - by the complexities of condominium creation 
and management, are likely to give preference to homeownership in detached housing and 
produce lower urban densities and larger sprawl. Cities with insufficient densities could become 
inefficient production locations. However, the reverse problem may also arise: abundant rental 
supply, especially if caused by policy interventions discouraging homeownership or reducing 
land supply for detached housing, may lead to excess densities in suburban locations and 
distorted land-use patterns.
17 
Rationale for Tenure Choice Policy 
It is beyond the scope of this study to make further conceptual elaborations of supply and 
demand in  the rental sector in transition countries. In the sector policy debate, the formal-
informal dichotomies and differentiations of landlord types play an important role. Essential 
questions arise, such as whether informal renting is good / efficient or bad / inefficient, what the 
optimum scale of social rental housing supply should be, and whether hybrid ownership forms 
(cooperatives, public-private partnerships) should be preferred to leverage public resources. 
Given the history of the Soviet-type public rental sector in these countries, further analysis is 
focused on describing the current role of public and private formal landlords.  
Looking beyond this study, the fundamental conceptual difficulty is to develop a normative 
perspective of public goods that should be delivered through housing policy interventions, and 
then discuss a set of policy instruments to stimulate either the supply or demand sides that are 
sufficiently efficient to support the housing consumption or tenure security of specific target 
groups. The public good definition in this context is difficult: should the policy support the 
housing consumption of low-income households, or raise the global housing consumption 
standard through regulatory means, or both? Before the age of public housing interventions, in 
the XIX
th Century, the answer was the filtering down of units from higher to lower quality levels, 
thus matching household means with housing consumption levels. The very raison d’être of the 
emerging instrument of housing policy in the early XX
th Century was to change this market 
outcome by enshrining minimum housing consumption standards in building codes.  
Setting high minimum standards for the stock is a double-edged sword, however, because it 
forces modernizations that break the filtering chain at a certain quality level, and leaves 
households that fall between the cracks if insufficient subsidies are available to support purchase 
or renting of modern units. Homelessness or over-crowding may result. Typically in ECA, the 
overlooked groups tend to be the young and mobile who support the economic dynamism of the 
region’s transforming economies. Moreover, enforcing such minimum standards to favor urban 
households—that is, those who live in areas yielding high labor productivity (with subsidies 
generated through tax payments of all households) – leads to mistargeting. A body of literature 
                                                 
16    Ongoing EU8 cross-country study on the geographical mobility of labor. 
17   Bertaud and Renaud (1993) discuss the land use patterns of socialist cities, which led to severe pricing 
distortions and hence misallocation of investments because of their planning constraints.  12 
on urban bias addresses such policy distortions. Securing the minimum housing quality and size 
constitutes a strong public intervention that deals with multiple goals and accepts the reality of 
imposing negative externalities. It not only requires a comprehensive system for target group 
screening, monitoring, and delivery - essentially the infrastructure of the welfare state - but also 
generates the need to counterbalance its distortionary effects in the labor and land markets 
through additional, corrective policies. 
In the 1980s, growing frustration over the inefficiencies of the European and North American 
welfare states inspired intense debates on the proper mix of policy instruments. Particularly 
frustrating was the fact that the dominating public housing policy instrument could not cater to 
many needy groups or even fulfill basic safety net functions in economies characterized by high 
dynamism and labor mobility. After decades of supply-side policy measures that pushed public 
housing ownership to record levels, many countries switched their policy focus to the demand 
side: rental allowances became popular and governments embarked on housing privatization 
programs and supported low-income housing supply from other than public sources - for 
example, through buying occupancy rights in the private rental sector and promoting 
cooperatives. This debate ultimately broadened the definition of public intervention from the 
narrowly defined concept of public housing provision to the demand-oriented concept of social 
housing. 13 
3.  EVIDENCE OF TENURE CHOICE 
Data and Methodology 
The data used in the study and presented in Table 1 are collected from the LSMS and HBS, 
nationally representative surveys developed to evaluate and track national living standards with 
the assistance of the World Bank and other donors.
18 The HBS includes more questions on 
household budgets than the LSMS; however, both surveys include information for creating a 
socioeconomic profile of households. Both have an advantage for housing sector analysis in that 
they focus on households, not physical housing stock units, so that questions about residuals 
arising from census data are of minor relevance.
19 The study team has analyzed the survey 
datasets available for five of the six studied countries for the most recent available year. For 
Lithuania, a specific household survey was performed in 2002 in cooperation with the World 
Bank with detailed housing sector questions, which qualifies it as a comparator.
20  
Table 1. Household Survey Data Descriptors 
 





Armenia 2001  Integrated Living Standards 
Survey  4,037 1,738  Expenditure 
Serbia 2002  Living Standards 
Measurement Survey  6,386 1,063  Consumption 
Romania  2002  Household Budget Survey  32,285  11,053  Consumption 
Russia 2003  NOBUS  44,493  25,223  Expenditure 
Poland  2000  Household Budget Survey  31,847  20,297  Expenditure 
Lithuania 2002 Lithuania  Household  Survey 3,000  n/a  Expenditure 
In this study, the focus was on the responses of 59,374 households living in urban apartments in 
five countries of the ECA region. Almost 50 percent of all households live in urban apartments. 
Special attention has been paid to ensuring comparability of definitions. For each country, the 
quintiles were calculated on the basis of expenditure or consumption data. For Armenia, Poland, 
Russia, and Lithuania, per capita expenditure was used as an income proxy while for Serbia and 
Romania, per capita consumption was used. The age of the household was coded in four distinct 
                                                 
18   The surveys used here are described in greater detail in the associated poverty assessments, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20204084
~menuPK:443282~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html (see Armenia 2004; Serbia 2003; 
Romania 2003; and Poland 2004). Information about the NOBUS in Russia is available at    
http://www.worldbank.org.ru/ECA/Russia.nsf/0/385AA5BB7DB68980C3256E53004B6F14. The Lithuanian 
survey is described in Lithuanian Free Market Institute (2002).   
19   For example, second homes and vacancies. 
20   The study was performed by the Lithuanian Free Market Institute within the scope of the National Housing 
Strategy project: http://www.am.lt/EN/VI/rubric.php3?rubric_id=134. 14 
categories: starters (ages 16–29), young families (ages 30–44), mature families (ages 45–59), and 
empty nesters (ages 60 and over). Four categories of dwelling status of the household were coded 
based on the household surveys: owned by the household (1), rented from the state (2), private 
rentals (3), and free or other (4). For each survey, the four categories were assigned based on the 
following information (Table 2).  
Table 2. Survey Specific Definitions of Dwelling Status 
 
Code Romania  Serbia  Armenia  Poland  Russia 
1=Own Personal 
property 
Owner   Owned  Ownership of house; ownership 
of apartment in municipal 
building or an apartment 
building, membership in 
cooperative, ownership; 










State or   
municipality 
rented 
Rental of apartment - regulated 














Rental of apartment - free 
market rent 
Leased from a 
private person, 
private legal entity 




Lives with no 
charge in a 
house one 
does not own 
Other  Sub-renting part of apartment; 
at parents’ or other person’s; 
other type of residence 
Other form of 
ownership, difficult 
to answer 
Housing cost primarily included rent, heat, gas, and electricity. The survey in each country posed 
the questions differently, and in some cases, common utilities might include items that are 
impossible to separate.  
Country Costs  included 
Armenia  Rent, heat, electricity, gas 
Serbia  Rent, water supply, garbage disposal, central heating, building maintenance, electricity 
Romania  Rent, water, sewerage and garbage collection, heat, electricity, other utilities 
Poland  Rent, electricity, gas, district heat and other fuels 
Russia  Rent, hot water, cold water, heat, gas, electricity 
In addition to survey analysis, the study also draws on published census results, official statistics, 
and data cited in secondary sources.   15 
Rental Housing Supply  
Supply Pattern – Volume and Quality 
Rental Housing Supply Volumes. Most available official statistics for ECA transition countries 
deal only with ownership, and not with tenure pattern, although in some cases census includes 
tenure questions.
21 A focus on ownership alone tends to systematically under-estimate rental 
tenure, because of the significance of individual private rental housing, subletting, and sharing. 
Such data sources are therefore not useful for analyzing the tenure choice and housing needs of 
young and socially vulnerable households, information fundamental for housing policy 
formulation.  
Analysis by external experts that could identify tenure from census data indirectly is rendered 
difficult through high barriers to access to the original census data. Barriers include complex 
administrative procedures, a general lack of public sector transparency, and sensitivity to the 
“politics” of the results—for example, in terms of ethnic structure in countries where there has 
been ethnic conflict.   
An alternative way to estimate the size of rental housing stock is to look at reported household 
tenure status, rather than classification of physical dwellings. The survey data reported in Table 3 
below show a non-owner-occupied housing sector of significant scale in the case countries. The 
share varies from 4.3 percent in Romania to 36.2 percent in Russia. The sector is not confined to 
public rental housing remaining after the apartment privatizations of the 1990s. In fact, the public 
sector is now surpassed by the combined private rental and rent-free (often against in-kind 
payment) sectors in Lithuania, Romania, and Serbia. The private rental sector is particularly 
significant in Poland (16.8 percent of households) and Lithuania (12.2 percent), followed at a 
great distance by Serbia (4 percent), Russia (3.6 percent), and Armenia (3 percent).  
Moreover, in two of the six studied countries the public rental sector is significant: Poland has 
30.6 percent rentals, with the private rental sector (16.8 percent) dominating the public rental 
sector (13.8 percent), and Russia has 35 percent rental, with the public rental sector (31.4 
percent) dominating the private rental sector (3.6 percent). Poland did not embark on across-the-
board top-down massive privatization, leaving it to municipalities to define and implement their 
privatization strategies. The country restituted ownership of a substantial volume of prewar 
rental buildings, and introduced an active, heavily subsidized construction program for private 
rental apartment buildings and an extended housing allowance program to cover private rental 
housing. Unintentionally, privatization of public apartments in Russia (31.4 percent of stock) has 
remained incomplete, as many households have chosen to hold off on executing privatization 
decisions. The public rental sector is presently marginalized in Armenia, Lithuania, and Serbia 
and almost eradicated in Romania.  
                                                 
21   The decennial censuses in some cases provide better information. The 2001 Armenian census makes it possible 
to identify tenure status. The 2002 Romanian census included a question on tenure status where the 1992 census 
did not; however, official analysis of the 2002 census has been incomplete. A positive example is Poland, where 
census and other housing sector statistics usually include tenure form statistics. 16 
Table 3. Tenure Structure in Studied Countries by Settlement Category 
 
Armenia Lithuania* 
% of households  Total Capital Urban  Rural  Total Capital Urban  Rural 
Owner-occupied 92.7 93.6 90.2 94.1 82.6  81.0 n/a  n/a 
Other tenure  7.3  6.4  9.8  5.9  17.4  19.0  n/a  n/a 
Public rental  5.8  3.6  8.3  5.5  3.8  4.1  n/a  n/a 
Private rental  1.5  2.8  1.6  0.4  12.2  13.6  n/a  n/a 
Free or other  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.4  1.3  n/a  n/a 
  Poland Romania 
Owner-occupied 66.4 48.7 56.4 87.8 95.7  94.8 94.3  97.4 
Other tenure  33.6  51.3  43.7  12.3  4.3  5.2  5.7  2.6 
Public rental  13.8  20.6  20.1  2.2  1.3  1.9  2.0  0.5 
Private rental  16.8  27.8  21.6  5.7  1.1  1.8  1.8  0.2 
Free or other  3.0  2.9  2.0  4.4  1.9  1.6  1.9  1.9 
  Russia  Serbia and Montenegro 
Owner-occupied 63.8 44.5 62.8 78.7 88.7  88.9 88.7  88.5 
Other tenure  36.2  55.5  37.2  21.3  11.3  11.1  11.3  11.5 
Public rental  31.4  53.0  32.6  14.6  2.3  2.5  2.1  2.4 
Private rental  3.6  1.8  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.6  4.0  4.2 
Free or other  1.1  0.7  0.6  2.7  5.1  5.0  5.1  5.0 
 
Source: Table 1.   
*Lithuanian Free Market Institute (2002).  
Note: For Lithuania‚ “capital” refers to the Vilnius region.  
Consequently, there are fundamental differences between the two groups of countries regarding 
the share of rental segments in the housing sectors. There are also essential differences in the 
structure of private rental housing. Two countries exhibit substantial private rentals: Lithuania 
(13.6 percent) and Poland (16.8 percent). In Lithuania most private rental is individual privatized 
apartments rented informally by their owners. In Poland, a large portion of private rentals are 
apartment buildings managed by licensed property managers for formal “professional” landlords, 
who report official incomes and use tax deductions for current and capital repairs.  
In some cases it appears likely that the household survey data underestimate rental sector size. 
One problem is that the number of households that rent privately is so small that even small 
sampling errors result in large changes in the observed mean. For this reason, it is important not 
to focus on whether the observed level is exactly 2 or 3 percent, but rather to keep in the mind 
the relative significance of the observed levels (that is, that there are very few private renters). 
Some under-reporting is also possible owing to private renters misstating their status. Reasons 
could include:  
  high levels of rental informality (and sometimes illegality), caused by tax or rent control 
evasion, which might induce respondents to deny the existence of rent payments or make 
false claims about ownership; 
  confusion about the character of the relationship caused by unclear ownership title, title 
that conveys usufruct rather than ownership, rental contracts that convey a purchase or 
cost-free privatization option that has not yet been exercised and is mixed up with 
ownership; 
  unrecorded subletting agreements made by sitting tenants, which may also be unlawful if 
concerns low-rent municipal apartments;  17 
  heterogeneity in the “free or other” category, where significant number of relationships is 
likely to imply in-kind payments including labor; 
  stigmatization of tenants in an environment of mass homeownership, which might lead to 
false claims of tenure status; 
  sharing of residential dwellings, where two households, often related, occupy a dwelling. 
By definition only one will be registered as formal owner or tenant, so the other should 
be deemed as renting, even though without a formal contract and payments. 
It is strongly recommended that countries interested in explicit rental housing policies should 
design systematic and consistent rental housing surveys, to avoid expensive incidental research 
efforts to distill the required data and information. An outline of such a survey is provided in 
Annex 2.   
Bearing these limitations in mind and considering other data sources and anecdotal evidence 
allows the following preliminary rapid assessments for each country (Figure 4): 
  According to the LSMS, the rental market in Armenia is relatively small at 7.3 percent, of 
which the lion’s share (5.8 percent) is non-privatized public apartments. Both ratios are 
substantiated by the 2001 census results. The private rental sector share of 1.3 percent is 
marginal, considering the country’s share of M-F stock, and likely has a significant 
element of under-reporting caused by tax evasion and tenants’ confusion about their 
status. This sector is concentrated in Yerevan. The public rental sector, in contrast, has 
remained relatively large, since non-privatized stock owned by the central government 
was transferred to the municipalities. The share is the highest in the earthquake zone of 
Gumri and Vanadzor. 
 
  The 2002 household survey undertaken in Lithuania by the Lithuanian Free Market 
Institute
22 shows that 17.4 percent the households live in non-owner-occupied housing. A 
total of 10.5 percent of the households polled live in housing owned by other individuals; 
3.8 percent in state-owned or municipal housing; and 1.7 percent in housing units that 
belong to an enterprise, institution, organization, or other legal entity. These results 
appear plausible, given that incentives for tax evasion and hence underreporting were 
reduced recently. The rental sector is relatively evenly distributed among urban areas.
23  
 
  With an estimate of slightly over one-third of households, the survey arrives at a similarly 
plausible non-owner-occupied share for the Polish housing market. The 2002 census data 
indicate a rental sector share of approximately 31 percent, roughly divided equally 
between public (municipal, state, non-profit TBS) and private (professional, individual, 
cooperative, and enterprise). Approximately 40 percent of the cooperative housing units 
in Poland are rented. The professional / formal apartment-building private rental sector is 
                                                 
22   The survey was undertaken within the work on national housing strategy supported by the PHRD Japanese 
government grant administered by the World Bank. 
23   In the region of Vilnius, the non-owner-occupied sector reaches 19 percent, of which 4 percent are public rental 
and 13.6 percent private rental. These values are not far above the country average. 18 
still small (approximately 600,000 units), although it is expected to grow as rent control 
barriers are removed. The private rental sector is particularly significant in Warsaw (27.8 
percent of households) and other larger urban areas (21.6 percent).  
 
  The survey data indicate existence of only a marginal rental sector for Romania of 2.4 
percent of the housing stock. This share is supported by the findings of the recent 2002 
census about tenure structure among occupied units (although the large number of 
unoccupied units confuses the picture
24). However, high levels of tax evasion and the 
apparently widespread stigmatization of tenants arising from one of the most radical 
privatization programs suggest underreporting incentives for households living in rental 
units. A Bucharest city government survey of 2003 arrived at an estimate of the private 
rental share of 5 percent, more than 2.5 times the level recorded by the survey data 
(although in absolute terms the difference is only 2–3 percent). The public rental sector 
share, in contrast, has plausibly fallen to less than 2 percent of the housing stock.  
 
  Similarly, the survey data are also likely to underestimate the size of the Russian private 
rental sector (at 3.6 percent). Puzanov (2004) estimates the sector size at about 5 percent; 
Kalinina and Klepikova (2002) describe private rental as the fastest growing real estate 
sector in Russia. The widespread tax informality and illegality of most rental 
arrangements in Russia is probably the largest factor contributing to under-reporting. The 
tenure status of the large reported public rental stock in Russia is undefined. Current 
legislation vests tenants with the free “callable” right to privatize, so public tenants can 
be interpreted as “pending” owners who have not yet exercised their privatization option. 
However, the new housing legislation recently adopted (the Housing Code) has stipulated 
a time limitation on these decisions. They would also curb the current practice of tenants 
in newly built municipal rental apartments privatizing their new units shortly after they 
get allocated to them. 
 
  The survey data appear to capture well the proportions of the rental sector in Serbia. 
Official sources suggest a rental sector share among households of 7 percent, of which 5 
percent are private tenants. The highest “free or other” share in the sample also concurs 
with official estimates.
25 It reflects the effect of numerous war refugees, who frequently 
live with families or in in-kind rental relationships, and a lack of cash in large segments 
of the population.  
                                                 
24   This could explain a part of the large number of unaccounted-for non-owner-occupied housing units that 
emerged from the 2002 Census. Of the 1.5 million units, only 212,000 are public rental units, leaving a gap of 
almost 1.3 million dwellings. These units should be vacant (possibly up to 700,000 of them), perform functions 
as second homes, or be part of the private rental sector.  
25   See Zivanovic (2003). 19 
 
Figure 4. Households by Tenure in Some Market and Transition Economies 
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Source: See Table 1 (ECA countries) and Sak and Raponi (2002) 
 
Unclear Responsibility for Common Property and Shadow Public Rental Sector. The tenant 
privatization wave of the 1990s left a large number of apartment buildings in the region with 
unclear ownership and responsibility with regard to common areas and surrounding land. In 
many of these M-F buildings, especially those in which public rental units remain, local 
governments or public utility companies continue to perform the full range of housing 
management and maintenance services. As a rule, because of a combination of historical bias 
against maintenance / repairs user fees during transition and the incentive problems of public 
providers, these services are delivered at insufficient payment levels. At the same time, the 
public providers cannot claim the benefits that legal ownership of the common areas or 
surrounding grounds would convey, including the option to evict defaulting users.  
Persistent under-pricing of maintenance and repair services, lack of competition among 
providers, and the common investment disincentives for privatized apartment owners created by 
often unclear ownership of common areas and surrounding grounds, have all resulted in 
continued deferred maintenance and increasing physical deterioration and capital depreciation of 
much of the M-F apartment buildings in the region.
26 The ownership structure of both individual 
apartment units and common areas and land in the apartment sector seems to be as follows 
(Table 4). 
                                                 
26   See World Bank (2004a). 20 
  In Armenia the remaining public stock is scattered. Likely more than 5 percent of the 
stock is located in buildings with mixed public-private unit ownership. By 2002 more 
than 40 percent of urban apartments were in condominiums; however, only half of these 
are reported to be active in management.
27 At least one-third of Armenian housing stock 
must thus be considered to be in buildings without clear ownership of common areas and 
land. Reinforcing the perception of continued public quasi-ownership, only a small part 
of the former public maintenance companies in Armenia has been privatized; in either 
form they continue to monopolize the maintenance market and provide poor services. 
Maintenance fees are low and usually set by local governments, which often bow to 
political pressure from the remaining public tenants and privatized owners.
 28 
  In Lithuania the share of housing stock in buildings with mixed public-private apartment 
ownership resulting from privatization is unknown. In our judgment, it is likely higher 
than 10 percent. Only about 15 percent of the privatized units in M-F stock are in 
buildings that have a condominium form; for the remainder ownership of common areas 
and land is unclear. Many of these units are reported to be under-maintained and 
frequently require urgent rehabilitation - especially for energy savings, given the 
country’s severe winters. They continue to be serviced entirely by local governments and 
public utilities, with the exception of district heating, which has been outsourced under a 
national management contract in the capital city and few other cities. The limited 
modernization and rehabilitation programs are heavily subsidized.
 29  
  Poland is the only studied country where the issue of unclear common area ownership is 
of less critical relevance, because it was obligatory to form condominium-style 
homeowners’ associations (HOA) at the moment apartments were privatized. The limited 
privatization activity during transition has led to a heterogeneous ownership structure, 
including a large municipal and cooperative sector. Legislation also strengthened the 
incentives to transfer the management of apartment buildings from municipalities to 
professional property managers.
30 The under-pricing of municipal management 
/maintenance services has been reduced with the privatization of many municipally 
owned housing servicing companies.  
  In Romania, according to government estimates, 34 percent of M-F buildings and 42 
percent of high-rise units are reported as having mixed public-private individual 
apartment ownership.
31 About half of the apartment stock is organized in condominiums. 
This leaves at least 20 percent of the housing stock without clear ownership structure for 
common areas and surrounding grounds. The lack of professional management and low 
maintenance contributions by owners is a bid problem. Maintenance of private 
                                                 
27   See Hamilton and Vecvagare (2003) and Desilets and Vanoyan (2003). 
28   See UN-ECE (2004c). 
29   See Morkunaite et al. (2003). 
30   In 1997 Poland introduced a state licensing system for property managers employed in managing residential 
properties. Other legislation constrained the voting rights of municipalities in condominiums in which they still 
owned units, thus facilitating a change in property management.  
31   See UN-ECE (2001). 21 
condominium buildings and grounds is still in many cases undertaken by public 
companies at below-cost payments. 
Table 4. Ownership of Apartments and Buildings in Studied Countries as % of Housing 
Stock 
% of housing stock*  Armenia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Serbia 
Apartment units  45.2 62.0 71.2 42.8  71.4 29.9
in public ownership  5.8 3.8 13.8 1.3  31.4 2.3
in private ownership  39.4 58.2 57.4 41.5  40.0 27.6
in buildings with 
condominiums 
5.9 8.7 5.8 20.7 5.0 n/a
in buildings with whole 
ownership structure* 
<5% <5% ~60-65 <5% <15% <5%
in other buildings  >33% >50% <5% >20% >50% >25%
in buildings with scattered 
public-private ownership 





Sources: Apartment sector size: National Statistical Offices. Ownership status: LSMS, HBS, and Lithuania 
Household Survey. Condominium status: Armenia, UN-ECE; Morkunaite, R., et al. (2003); Poland, National 
Statistical Office; Russia, Ellis (2003). Buildings in other whole ownership structure and other buildings: Authors’ 
assessment. Buildings with scattered public-private apartment ownership: Romania, UN-ECE; Russia, Ellis (2003); 
the authors’ assessment. 
*Buildings owned by companies, individual landlords, cooperatives, or government. 
  Because of the incomplete privatizations, mixed public-private apartment ownership 
currently characterizes almost the entire Russian M-F housing stock. Condominiums and 
cooperatives have been created in only an estimated 7 percent of the stock
32; the 
ownership of common areas and land in the remainder is ambiguous. Because 
maintenance has rarely been privatized, local governments spend on average 70 percent 
of their budgets on housing and communal services, making the owner-occupied sector 
heavily subsidized and essentially a form of public rental. The situation is exacerbated by 
large number of entitlements (l’goti) granted to numerous population categories in the 
form of exemptions from and abatements of housing and utility payments.
33 Because cost 
recovery is still largely insufficient at ratios of about 60 percent, persistent deferred 
maintenance and insufficient energy conservation measures continue to trouble the 
sector.
34 
  In Serbia, mixed public-private apartment unit ownership is still common because many 
units remained un-privatized owing to quality or tenant idiosyncrasies. There is no 
reliable information about the share of condominiums in the apartment stock, but it 
appears to be rather very low. It is not clear who owns the common areas and land in the 
                                                 
32   See UN-ECE (2004b) and Skyner (2004). 
33    The government has recently boldly eliminated or “monetized” many entitlements, but left those pertaining to 
housing and communal services to be tackled later. 
34   See Ellis (2003). 22 
largest part of the apartment sector. Large public utility companies, typically owned by 
municipalities, still provide most of maintenance services as local monopolies, including 
condominium buildings, in cases where some apartments are still owned as municipal 
rentals. Municipal building maintenance services are under-priced and frequently cross-
subsidized through asset sales and commercial renting.
35 Not surprisingly, the level of 
buildings and ground maintenance in M-F apartment stock has been highly insufficient, 
resulting in staggering physical deterioration and economic decapitalization. 
Skyner (2004) has characterized the Russian stock of apartment buildings with unclear 
ownership of common areas and land as de jure public. Legal analysis in different countries may 
lead to different conclusions. However, considering the amount of legal ambiguity in 
combination with the scale of public under-maintenance and other de facto ownership tasks still 
performed by the public service providers, one may assume that a large shadow public rental 
sector still exists in the ECA region.  
Rental Housing Quality. Is the rental sector marginalized in terms of the quality of housing 
services provided? There are two central aspects to this question: the concentration of rental 
housing in the urban apartment sector, and within that sector the selection effects that have led to 
a specific quality distribution between rented and individually owned (privatized) units. 
Concerning the first aspect, the conventional wisdom in the transition countries is that urban 
apartments, which make up the vast majority of rental units constructed mostly after World War 
II, are better equipped with amenities than the traditional detached houses of smaller towns and 
villages. However, the rental sector is caught in the continuing common-area management 
problems mentioned above that characterize almost the entire apartment stock, which renders the 
provision of sufficient funds for maintenance and capital repairs difficult. Some of the postwar 
urban stock in the region also suffers from well-publicized structural defects and mismatch of 
unit size, layouts, amenities, and locations with today’s demand patterns, which make their long-
term sustainability questionable even with proper technical management/maintenance and 
sufficient ability to pay on the part of occupiers. 
The level of apartment stock deficiencies in the studied countries appears profound, in terms of 
structural defects, deferred maintenance, or dwelling-household mismatches. The findings of 
recent country analyses are alarming: the Armenian urban apartment stock has been described as 
progressively deteriorating; many units are physically dilapidated.
36 More than a third of Polish 
apartments are considered structurally defective, of which half are considered ripe for 
demolition.
37 The UN-ECE (2001) report estimates that 80 percent of the Romanian apartment 
building stock will not survive the coming 20 years, because of structural defects and the results 
of deferred maintenance. Similarly, UN-ECE (2004b) estimates that 20 percent of Russian 
housing stock, most of it in the M-F buildings, needs urgent capital repairs or rehabilitation 
                                                 
35   For in-depth description of this growing problem see, for example, Ellis (2003). 
36   See Desilets and Vanoyan (2003). 
37   See Dübel (2004), based on estimates by HypoVereinsbank Polska. 23 
(renovation). Other sources speak of 40 million persons living in substandard units, with 5 
million in units slated for demolition.
38  
It is instructive to note that as of 2004 in eastern Germany, which may be seen as a fast-forward 
case of housing sector transition, some 1 million postwar apartment units - 20 percent of the 
apartment stock - are earmarked for demolition or have been demolished already. The 
demolitions were preceded by rising vacancies that reduced the investment capacity of the 
housing companies. Much of this phenomenon was driven by market reasons as households 
migrated to Western regions and also were given subsidy incentives to buy “greenfield” single-
family houses. In some cases even new private rentals were subsidized. This experience indicates 
that, even with higher individual affordability, much of the postwar apartment housing stock in 
the region may become economically obsolete well within its physical life span. Despite 
individual in-depth country analysis there is still lack a systematic comparative study for the 
region that delivers standardized building quality and investment costs assessments and 
compares them with measures of demand and available public resources.
39  
Concerning the second aspect, the distribution of quality in the urban apartment stock between 
tenure forms can be seen as strongly influenced by selection effects that resulted from the speed 
and scope of privatization to sitting tenants.  
  The remaining public tenants are generally found to have not privatized their units 
because of quality deficiencies and inadequate location, inability to resell or rent the unit, 
or issues related to their characteristics disqualifying them as owners. This negative 
selection effect has led to extremely poor residual public rental quality and locations for 
Armenia, Lithuania, Romania, Serbia, and partly also Russia. A World Bank report 
(2004) speaks of progressing “slumification.” 
  For private rental tenants, we find very diverse quality levels. Adverse quality selection is 
caused partly by how units come to the market. Quality issues may be exacerbated by the 
absence of investment incentives, such as rent controls, and by a tax bias against renting. 
Particularly affected are the un-renovated restituted buildings, which are still rent 
controlled. However, private rental tenants in the formerly public postwar multifamily 
stock do not seem to suffer systematically from lower quality housing, relative to owners.   
Available evidence also suggests that the limited supply of rental housing available relative to 
the scale of migrants and young households seeking accommodation has led to crowding in the 
private rental stock, especially in attractive cities, and helped raise rent levels. 
                                                 
38    As estimated by Rosstroi in 2004. 
39   The EU Commission is focusing its March 2005 meeting of European housing ministers on this aspect.  24 
Table 5. Tenure and Crowding in Studied Countries 
 
Armenia Poland Romania Russia  Serbia  Per capita 
figures  Space   Rooms  Space Rooms Space  Rooms Space  Rooms  Space  Rooms
Owner-
occupied 
10.05 0.62 28.41 1.64 16.73 1.05 15.96  n/a  24.88 0.95 
Public rental  9.59  0.60  20.25  1.33  14.51  0.90  13.62  n/a  21.81  0.89 
Private rental  9.23  0.58  21.40  1.27  17.92  1.04  12.57  n/a  21.47  0.81 
Free or other  n/a  n/a  25.04  1.49  18.01  1.09  14.59  n/a  20.89  0.86 
Source:  Household surveys (Table 1).  
Note: Urban apartment sector. Space is in square meters. Comparable data for Lithuania are not available.  
Without detailed rental sector surveys and with inappropriate census methodologies for tracking 
rentals, it is hard to capture the quality effects with data. However, results have been compiled 
for the quality dimension of crowding (Table 5). As expected, the Armenian and Russian urban 
rental stocks are the most crowded, followed closely by the residual public rental sector in 
Romania.
40 Tenants in Poland have a considerably larger supply of space and rooms than their 
counterparts elsewhere in the region. Owner-occupied units, in turn, are considerably more 
spacious than rental units.   
A more detailed empirical analysis of quality issues affecting the rental housing stock is beyond 
the scope of this study. However, the situation in Lithuania, which was recently evaluated more 
closely, may be considered quite representative of the region.
41 The private rental stock in 
Lithuania falls into three levels of quality: (i) few hundred units in newly constructed private 
rental housing for the upscale market, serving mostly foreigners; (ii) larger market for prewar 
housing stock in inner cities, mostly restituted buildings; and (iii) “retail” micro rental market in 
the privatized postwar apartment stock. A majority of private renters live in the postwar stock, 
mostly in small one-room (studio) apartments. According to the Vilnius city government, the 
remaining 4,000 public rental buildings, all of them in the postwar apartment stock, exhibit 
“slumification” tendencies.
42  
Supply Changes – Stock Conversions and New Construction 
Existing Stock Conversions 
Conversion Mechanisms   
At the inception of reform in 1989 there was almost no formal, private rental housing supply in 
the studied countries. Private rental supply in transition countries was thereafter established 
                                                 
40   World Bank (2004a) reports evidence on the positive relationship between per capita space and GDP in 
transition countries. 
41   See Lithuania Free Market Institute (2002), Morkunaite et al. (2003), and interviews. 
42   The more or less cohesively public stock is reported to be of poor quality and often in unfavorable locations. 25 
through three main conversion mechanisms within existing stock: (i) sublease of privatized or 
public rental units by individual private landlords; (ii) restitution to prewar owners or their heirs; 
and (iii) acquisition by landlords on the active secondary market that emerged from massive 
privatization.  
Letting of Privatized or Public Rental Units 
Cash income-poor owners or tenants who let their own unit or individual rooms were the first 
source of private rental supply during transition and continue to play a significant role in the 
poorer countries. The higher the rental income relative to employment or retirement income, the 
more active are these subsistence landlords. A 1999 survey of the rental markets in Sofia and 
Budapest (Lowe 2003) showed that 60 percent of private landlords in Sofia rented out a dwelling 
originally intended for their own use, while only 45 percent did so in Budapest. The main reason 
cited for the difference was that cash income levels of landlords were lower in Sofia than in 
Budapest. Without detailed analysis one can conjecture that these figures could be representative 
of the studied countries, with Armenia, Russia, and Serbia having the highest share of 
subsistence landlords.  
Restitution of Prewar Property 
It is hardly coincidental, though difficult to substantiate with data, that Poland and Lithuania are 
the two countries most advanced in the restitution process, featuring the largest formal private 
rental sectors. Conversion restrictions in both countries generally forced the restituted owners to 
continue renting to sitting tenants, rather than obtain vacant possession of their buildings.
43 
Countries with slow (Romania) or no (Russia) restitution processes have smaller formal private 
rental sectors.
44  
Units Bought on Secondary Market for Renting  
Secondary market acquisitions have become an increasingly relevant source of private small 
rental supply since the mid-1990s, particularly in the more established markets of Poland and 
Lithuania, and to a lesser degree also in Romania and Russia. The initial movement of amateur 
micro-investors who accumulated portfolios by buying out neighbors gave way to a small private 
rental industry, sometimes with large individual portfolios of apartments scattered in various 
buildings. Poland also has witnessed the emergence of an active market for entire private 
apartment rental buildings and a professional landlord and property management industry in the 
wake of restitutions of prewar apartment rental buildings.  
Private investment in rental assets received an additional push around 2000 when the 
combination of falling interest rates and high residential rental yields in the region created more 
conducive environment. In Lithuania, according to brokers interviewed for this study, the rental 
                                                 
43   Although restituted owners were often allowed to reclaim individual dwellings for their family use. 
44   In an example from non-study countries, Lowe (2003) cites that 12 percent of Sofia landlords rented restituted 
units, while there was no such source in Budapest, because of the sluggishness of the Hungarian restitution 
program, which was severely constrained by insufficient court capacity. 26 
supply from portfolios accumulated on the secondary market by 2004 became large enough to 
put downward pressure on rents. Similarly, in Poland the professional landlord industry 
continued to grow. The relevance of access to pertinent financing is demonstrated by a result 
reported in Lowe (2003): in the Budapest-Sofia survey, 36 percent of landlords in Budapest—
benefiting from the better developed and subsidized housing finance system of Hungary—
bought units with the intent to let them, compared with only 22 percent in Sofia. 
Public Rental Supply from the Secondary Market  
The secondary market has become an interesting source for new public rental housing supply, 
which traditionally was limited to new construction and (usually slow) tenant turnover. In 
Bucharest, owing to limited funding for new construction efforts, the local government has been 
actively buying inexpensive apartments on the secondary market as a low-cost way to replenish 
the social housing stock. In a similar effort, Moscow has tried to preserve public stock by halting 
privatization through inducing new tenants to sign “dwelling use contracts,” which do not legally 
qualify as tenancy and thus do not confer the option of almost free privatization. Some Polish 
cities have been buying cheaper cooperative and privately owned restituted dwellings, and are 
considering the repurchase of privatized units. Anecdotal evidence brings also some cases where 
privatized dwellings are being offered back to municipalities by privatized tenants to settle 
arrears and to skip payments due for upgrading and capital repairs. In Lithuania the secondary 
market mechanism has been enhanced by central government funds earmarked for municipalities 
to acquire housing for social rental purposes.  
New Rental Construction 
New Private Rental Construction 
Capital cities in transition countries typically feature a very small upscale private rental market 
served by corporate investors that caters to other corporations, foreigners, embassies, and other 
high-income clients. Stock conversions often do not produce sufficient quality levels for these 
clients, in dwelling type, standard, and location. New construction has been active in the largest 
and capital cities in the region (Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Warsaw, Vilnius, Bucharest, 
Belgrade). Other cities have very little or no corporate investment in rental housing so far.
45 
Evidence for new construction activity catering to average domestic households is limited to 
Poland. 
New Public and PPP Rental Construction 
All the studied countries except Armenia and Serbia have started new public rental programs in 
response to the sluggish recovery of housing construction during the transition and to the 
expanding waiting lists for public housing allocation. Particularly active are Poland and Russia, 
which both have specific PPP models for rental construction. In Poland, municipal and mixed 
public-private non-profit rental housing (TBS) construction in 2002 amounted to 8 percent of 
                                                 
45   Lowe (2003) reports that 2.1 percent of rental investors in Sofia were corporate investors, and there was no 
evidence of corporate investors in Budapest. 27 
newly constructed units. In Russia, because of the lack of private urban land, local governments 
“participate” in the majority of new construction projects, extracting an unknown share of public 
rental units from developers.
46 The new construction programs in Romania and Lithuania are 
small and targeted to certain groups (low income, students). Recently, associations of banks and 
developers in Poland have been discussing a new PPP scheme, which would produce new rental 
housing by private sector partners, which would be made available to municipalities on long-
term lease basis and used by them for social rental housing policy objectives. Municipalities 
would help mostly in terms of providing access to serviced building lots dedicated to such 
construction. 
Rental Housing Demand 
In the tenure choice literature discussed earlier, rental housing demand is seen primarily as a 
function of income and life-cycle circumstances of the household involved. In the analysis of the 
studied countries that follows, the focus is on exploring those empirical relations. Other 
important demand determinants, such as deeper household type differentiations, income risk 
factors (proxied by professional status), and wealth and access to finance, are referred to future 
research. A brief review is made of available evidence concerning the impact of intra-country 
migration and the mismatch of available dwelling attributes and demand. These are the two 
factors expected to show high empirical significance for the housing sectors in transition; 
unfortunately, data problems are encountered here, calling again for better census information or 
in-depth rental housing surveys in the future. 
Demand Structure – Life Cycle and Income 
Rental Housing Demand and Life Cycle 
Private Rental Sector  
In the urban economies of transition countries,
47 the private rental sector is a pivotal source of 
supply for “housing starters” (Figure 5). These are young single households or couples between 
the ages of 16 and 29 - and young families between the ages of 30 and 44 with at least one 
child.
48 This is consistent with the pattern in market economies.
49  
Poland has the highest share among housing starters with 24 percent, followed closely by Russia, 
Serbia, and Armenia. Even in Romania, with the smallest overall private rental sector share, 12 
percent of starters are recorded as private renters. The high Lithuanian figure of 34 percent could 
                                                 
46        Municipalities in Russia control access to land and continue “spot zoning,” which forces developers to 
relinquish some new dwellings to municipalities in exchange for land access and necessary zoning.  
47   The urban-rural income divergence is very large in these countries—especially Poland, Romania, and Russia in 
this study—and thus must be cancelled to arrive at meaningful results. Hence, we report only data for urban 
areas. 
48   Owing to availability constraints, data for Lithuania are added under a different definition, which yields a lower 
age average within each category. 
49   See Chiuri and Jappelli (2000). 28 
be partly due to the lower average age, as the age bracket definition differs from the rest of the 
studied countries; however, anecdotal evidence suggests a similar relevance of private rental for 
young households, as in Poland. 
Excluding Poland, where the private rental share is almost invariant over age brackets, housing 
starters in the ECA region are between 2.6 and 6.5 times as likely to be private rental tenants as  
the population as a whole. For such households, subsidized rental housing such as university 
dormitories and company housing is available only in isolated cases. Consequently, starters in 
the region are relegated to seek rental tenure in the private market, with its frequently much 
higher rents (see below).
50  
In the category of young families (Table 6 and Figure 5), with household heads between ages 30 
and 44, the owner-occupied ratio rises; but still the private rental sector is of high relevance, 
catering to between 5 and 27 percent of households. Given the likely high degree of under-
reporting of private rental status in the surveys for Romania and Russia discussed earlier, one 
should consider the figures obtained for these countries in all age brackets as their lower 
boundaries.  
Table 6. Urban Tenure by Young Households in Studied Countries 
 
Armenia Lithuania* 
% of households 
Total Starters Young 
families 
Total Starters Young 
families 
Owner-occupied 91.6  68.2  85.8  82.6  60.4  83.0 
Other  tenure  8.4 31.8 14.2  17.4 39.6 17.0 
Public rental  5.9  17.1  9.0  3.8  4.0  4.5 
Private  rental  2.5 14.7  5.2  12.2 33.9 11.4 
Free or other  n/a  n/a  n/a  1.4  1.6  1.1 
  Poland Romania 
Owner-occupied 55.4  43.9  50.0  95.2  79.2  94.6 
Other tenure  44.6  56.1  50.0  4.8  20.8  5.4 
Public rental  20.9  32.0  22.7  1.5  1.9  1.8 
Private rental  23.7  24.2  27.3  1.9  11.9  1.9 
Free or other        1.4  7.0  1.7 
  Russia  Serbia and Montenegro 
Owner-occupied 56.0  47.7  51.7  84.7  73.9  86.8 
Other tenure  44.0  52.3  48.3  15.3  26.2  13.2 
Public rental  40.7  32.6  43.1  3.9    5.8 
Private rental  3.0  19.4  4.7  7.1  18.1  4.9 
Free or other  0.4  0.4  0.6  4.4  8.1  2.5 
 
Source: Household surveys (Table 1).  
*Lithuanian Free Market Institute (2002). 
Note: Urban apartment sector, except Lithuania (entire housing sector). Private rental includes company housing and 
excludes in-kind and free housing. Age definitions: starters, 16–29 years; young families: 30–44 years (with at least 
one child). Lithuania Household Survey age definitions: starters, all under 20 years; young households, 30–39 years 
(regardless of number of children).  
                                                 
50   Sub-renting is typically at market rents, while formal renting is often subject to rent controls—or at least to rent 
review controls, as in Poland. 29 
  

















Source: Household surveys (Table 1)  
Public Rental Sector 
In stark contrast to the figures on private rental, the data show that the capacity of the public 
rental sector to absorb young starter households is highly impaired in large parts of the region 
(Table 6). The comparison between Poland and Russia is telling: in Poland, with an actively 
managed public and public-private housing system (discussed below), starter households are 
proportionally over-represented in public rental housing and proportionally represented in private 
rental housing. In Russia, in contrast, starters are both significantly under-represented in public 
rental housing and vastly over-represented in privately rented housing. Similarly, the public 
rental sector no longer is significant as a source of housing for young households in Lithuania, 
Romania, and Serbia.
51 
 The private rental sector has turned into a significant source of supply for the young - and the 
most mobile households, while the public rental sector has lost at least part of its policy 
functionality for such groups. Has it retained its functionality in the income dimension? 
                                                 
51   In Serbia the survey found no starter households in the public rental sector. 30 
Rental Housing Demand and Income Distribution 
Private Rental Sector  
Data on the distribution of households living in urban apartments by a suitable measure of 
income
52 show that the private rental sector caters to all income groups (Table 6). However, 
differences can be identified when analyzing individual income groups as follows: 
  in Armenia, Russia, and Romania, where private rental supply is scarce, the sector is 
strongly over-represented - even in relation to owners - in the highest income quintile. 
Independent evidence from the Lithuania household survey, which does not control for 
location and type of dwelling, suggests likewise an over-representation of private rental 
in the highest income quintile. It is somewhat under-represented in the highest income 
groups in Poland (which, however, has a deep overall private rental sector); 
  in Poland, Serbia, and to some degree in Russia, urban private rental sector is strongly 
over-represented in the lowest income quintile, relative to owners, and even relative to 
public rental. In Russia, as (see Table 2), private rental sector is also quite large in rural 
areas, where household incomes are lower. This suggests not only high access costs to 
ownership, but also an important absorption function of the private rental sector for poor 
households, which is closer to the pattern in mature market economies. 
The interpretation of the data is complicated by the fact that incomes and age are generally 
correlated over the life cycle, so their effects cannot be separately identified using the current 
methodology.
53 Urban starters and young families, who are over-represented in the private rental 
sector, are typically richer rather than poorer in the region, since they generally constitute 
economic winners of the transition. There are few exceptions: in Armenia, the income 
distribution is bifurcated - young households are either poor or rich (Table 7). Also, in Poland, 
outside the largest cities, young urban households are not generally richer than older households. 
Public Rental Sector  
Table 7 reveals that, from a housing policy perspective, the public rental sector’s income-tenure 
share relationship has the right negative sign in only two of the five countries (Armenia and 
Romania). In Poland (see also Figure 6) and Serbia, middle-income groups are over-represented. 
In Russia the income profile of public rental tenants is almost identical to that of owners (see 
also Figure 7). The results for Poland and particularly for Russia are dictated by the residual 
effect of tenants allocated under socialist rule to dwellings that did not privatize during the 
transition. In Russia, in the current legal situation, sitting public rental tenants can be considered 
de facto owners waiting to execute their privatization option.
54 In Poland the non-profit rental 
                                                 
52   In the transition countries, it is useful to replace the concept of household income through proxies such as 
household expenditure and consumption. This is mainly due to frequent underreporting of income and the 
significant size of the shadow economy. 
53   A probit-logit regression or other econometric techniques that allow for separation of these effects could be 
undertaken in the future. 
54   See Ellis (2003). 31 
sector, which is geared toward middle-income groups (see below), may have caused some 
increase in the reported average income of public tenants.  
Table 7. Tenure and Household Income in Studied Countries 
 
Households Armenia  Lithuania* 








I 20.8  28.3  20.0  n/a  n/a  n/a 
II 18.9  16.5  18.9  n/a  n/a  n/a 
III 18.9  23.7  22.3  n/a  n/a  n/a 
IV 19.2  15.3  13.1  n/a  n/a  n/a 
V 22.2  16.3  25.7  n/a  n/a  n/a 
  Poland Romania 
I 9.9  16.4  21.2  8.9  32.9  9.2 
II 15.5  21.1  20.6  14.3  25.1  9.8 
III 19.5  21.8  21  20  18.4  16.4 
IV 24.7  21.3  19.6  25  11.5  21.6 
V 30.3  19.4  17.7  31.9  12.2  43.1 
  Russia  Serbia and Montenegro 
I 10.9  13.1  17.6  21.5  14.6  27.5 
II 17.6  17.8  15  19.2  20.5  20.2 
III 20.8  20.9  16  19  24  14.6 
IV 23.1  24.1  17.9  19.1  26.6  21.1 
V 27.7  24.1  33.6  21.3  14.3  16.6 
Source: Household surveys (Table 1).  
Note: Urban apartment sector, income proxies (for definitions, see data descriptors in Table 1).  
In contrast, low-income households in Armenia, Romania, and also Lithuania
55 are strongly 
over-represented in the urban public rental sector (see also Figure 8 for Romania). However, this 
empirical result reflects the sector’s marginalization after the almost completed massive 
privatization rather than an outcome of purposeful public policy. Still, even in these countries 
some income-rich tenants remain in the public stock and continue to pay very low “token” rents. 
                                                 
55   Data from the Lithuanian Household Survey in 2002 suggest an overrepresentation of both very poor and very 
rich tenants in the public stock. This is partly due to the relatively uniform distribution of public housing among 
urban and rural locations. However, anecdotal evidence for Vilnius suggests a concentration of poor clients even 
in a high-income region. 32 
 















Source:  Household surveys (Table 1) 















Source: Household surveys (Table 1). 33 















Source  :Household surveys (Table 1)  
Demand Changes—Spatial and Social Mobility 
Spatial Mobility and Labor Markets 
Spatial Mobility / Migration 
Does the emerging rental sector in transition economies play the role in migration and labor 
market adjustment that it conceptually should play? Do the small rental sector sizes observed for 
some countries bar labor market adjustments and hamper economic growth? Mainstream 
migration research for transition countries continues to suffer from the weak linkage between the 
traditional labor market and the hypotheses formulated by the new spatial economics. Migration 
analysts invariably test for relative wages and unemployment factors but give little consideration 
to the effects of factors in the non-tradable goods sector. However, some of the analyses for 
transition countries hold indirect clues to the relevance of the housing sector.  
Fidrmuc (2002), for example, finds for Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary that 
net migration between regions has been far less responsive (elastic) to inter-regional wage and 
unemployment differentials than expected under traditional labor market models. This suggests 
the presence of some threshold costs of migration that could include relative housing costs.  
Kallai (2003) analyzes interregional migration patterns for Romania with explicit consideration 
of the costs of migration. She observes an unexpected positive correlation between migration and 
the regional income level for low-income groups. As in the Fidrmuc study, this suggests a cost 
threshold for migration that distorts labor market adjustment. The differences in income 
distribution in Romania are stark (Figure 9): the typical monthly rent of a Bucharest apartment, 34 
US$100, is a considerable investment for a dweller in Romania’s rural areas. Our data confirm 
that renting in Romania is essentially limited to the two highest income quintiles (Table 7).  
 



























Source: Household surveys (Table 1). 
A recent World Bank report (2004a) draws similar conclusions when discussing the low mobility 
of households in transition countries compared with developed markets. This report uses 
household survey data to establish that it is mainly households in the highest income quintile and 
particularly residents of capital cities that tend to move. And anecdotal evidence from various 
cities gained during this study indicates that almost all housing supply for such migrants in 
successful regions is provided by the private rental sector, consistent with the experience of 
mature economies. However, both results can be interpreted in two very different ways: either 
they suggest a sufficiently large housing supply elasticity in the successful regions to allow for 
labor market adjustment and growth, or they simply reflect high turnover rates in a supply-
constrained (rental) housing market segment with little labor market and growth benefit.  
The general scarcity of rental housing, absence of new production, and high rent levels presented 
in this study provides indirect evidence that in many attractive cities in transition countries 
housing supply constraints dominate migration, not vice versa. Since rental sector supply 
elasticity depends entirely on mobilizing existing housing stock, not new construction, the 
outbidding of sitting tenants by migrants crucially determines total migration activity. Examples 35 
for displaced sitting tenants are elderly or other socially vulnerable households that are 
sufficiently cash income - poor to be attracted to vacate their units, usually against a side 
payment.
56 However, relying on a stock conversion mechanism alone, when new construction is 
economically not feasible, leads to inefficiency over time: the number of sitting tenants who can 
be outbid by migrants shrinks to zero. The higher minimum wage level required by migrants to 
compensate for the resultant rising rents will eventually stop migration.  
Analysis from a different empirical perspective supports the perception of housing supply 
inelasticity. The urban hierarchy - measured by the relationship of a city’s rank in the nation to 
its size - has barely changed during the first decade of transition, which was characterized by 
significant regional labor market changes. In contrast, city hierarchies changed drastically during 
the last decade before transition, the 1980s, which was characterized by high housing 
construction activity levels.  
Table 8. City Rank and Size—Little Change during Transition 
 
 Poland  Romania  Russia  Serbia 
Year Beta Year Beta Year Beta Year Beta Year 
~1980  0.85 1982 0.89 1977 0.77 1979 0.86 1981 
~1990 0.80  1992  0.86  1992  0.735 1989 0.85  1001 
2002 0.81 2002 0.87 2002 0.735 2002 0.84 2002 
Source: Statistical offices, the authors’ estimates.  
Note: The equation tested is ln (city size) = α + β* ln (city ranking). Sample sizes: Poland = 100, Romania = 70, 
Russia = 109, Serbia = 49. Fit quality: all R
2 greater than 0.95. Armenia and Lithuania are excluded because of low 
sample sizes. City size is defined by administrative borders, which tends to lead to lower betas relative to wider 
metropolitan definitions. 
Regression analysis is normally used to test an empirical regularity between city size and city 
rank, called Zipf’s Law.
57 For all four countries analyzed, the 1980s brought certain 
decentralization, most pronounced in Poland and Russia, while the 1990s brought no change or 
only a small recentralization (Table 8). Considering the declining relevance of mono-industrial 
cities and the increasing relevance of agglomeration effects in a market economy, a strong 
recentralization and closer approximation of Zipf’s Law (beta = 1) would have been expected 
had labor and residential mobility been unconstrained. Deichmann and Henderson (2000) 
confirm for Poland that rural-urban migration has significantly declined during the transition, 
                                                 
56   In Lithuania, for example, many elderly privatized tenants in Vilnius, who moved to the city after World War II, 
are enticed by real estate brokers to sell off and return to the much cheaper towns and villages of their childhood 
for retirement. Their Vilnius dwellings are then sold to small investors for renting out to in-migrants pulled to 
the city by the strong labor market. 
57   See Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), Chapter 12. 36 
despite the fact that Poland is still considered to be under-urbanized. They also point directly to 
the relevance of housing shortages that might reduce labor mobility.
58  
The main thrust of counteracting policies would be to increase rental supply elasticity, through 
either new construction activity or more systematic stock mobilizations as a result of rent 
decontrols and the like. In particular, deeper liquidity of the rental market would be pivotal: it 
would not only allow the successful region to avoid the cost-induced wage wedge that blocks 
migration, it would also minimize the social imbalances associated with dislocating sitting 
tenants.
 59 
Social Mobility and Filtering 
Social Mobility / Filtering 
Is there empirical evidence that the rental sector in transition countries starts to fulfill its function 
as a mechanism of adjusting housing consumption to income levels through a chain of moves? 
Data for assessing this question even superficially are missing in this study, but the issue should 
be addressed in a follow-up study. An educated guess at this stage would be that the private 
rental sector, albeit often very small and expensive, is beginning to fulfill a considerable function 
in the filtering / moving chain. The function is still mostly on the receiving end, as the sector has 
expanded with the number of migrating households. Restitution and secondary market 
transactions have already led to a filtering down of a significant amount of older apartment units 
to the urban private rental sector. Also, in countries with developing mortgage markets in the 
region (in our sample, Poland, Lithuania, Russia, and Romania), a growing number of young 
households are upgrading from the private rental sector to ownership, considerably assisted in 
some cases by mortgage subsidies. 
The public sector housing stock, by contrast, seems an anomaly. The classical predictions of 
filtering theory suggest that public rental carries few or no price incentives to relocate for 
households with rising incomes because of its low rents, which lead to excess consumption of 
space. In the studied countries, the presence of extremely low public rents is indeed a fact. 
However, it is unclear whether, despite such low levels, rents are generally subsidized, since 
investment in public units is extremely low, too. As a result, higher-income tenants face an 
intolerable loss of housing utility, in some cases “slumification,” when they remain in the public 
stock. In most parts of the ECA region, except those with very scarce housing, higher-income 
households are leaving the deteriorating neighborhoods, with their heterogeneous social-
economic mix, to settle into newly developed or gentrified older housing areas that are more 
socially homogenous and segregated.  
                                                 
58   Similar problems are characteristic for Russia, where World Bank (2004b, Executive Summary, Page ii) finds 
that Russia “appears to be ‘missing’ a sizeable number of large cities (with more than 1 million 
inhabitants).”(Quotation marks in the original.) 
59   Some of the relationships between labor and housing markets described, including references to Western EU 
countries, are expected to be examined in the upcoming Bank study on labor mobility in the new EU member 
states. 37 
How much the dynamics of the filtering process of public units depend on the elasticity of 
demand created by the interaction with the private rental and the homeownership / mortgage 
sectors and public sector investment strategies can be studied by comparing the cities of Vilnius 
and Bucharest:  
  In Vilnius public rental housing has been marginalized through privatization. The private 
rental sector is the only remaining receiving sector for young households and migrants. 
Rents in Lithuania are decontrolled, and access to mortgage finance at very low rates 
creates effective demand for higher-income owners or tenants for filtering-up purposes, 
adding to rental housing supply and greenfield detached housing construction for owner 
occupation. In this elastic supply, responsive environment, public units have 
progressively “slumified.” In a belated response, the recently adopted National Housing 
Strategy calls for an explicit government social housing program. However, given low 
economic demand or remaining tenants and the level of decay, many public units cannot 
be economically modernized and will have to exit the market. 
  The private rental sector in Bucharest suffered from much greater policy and market 
constraints in the past, including legislated rent controls on restituted properties and the 
complete lack of mortgage finance in a high-inflation environment. This put severe 
brakes on the creation of new housing supply, even though the city has land reserves, 
pushed rents upwards, and so far kept the social mix in the remaining public units. As the 
mortgage markets began to develop lately, tenants or owners of moderate or low-quality 
housing are receiving modest relocation incentives. The Bucharest city government is 
banking on this filtering-up effect by setting up a program to purchase vacated housing 
units cheaply, to re-create a public rental sector. Although these units are usually of low 
quality, they have not yet slumified because of sufficient remaining demand. A public 
investment strategy, however limited in financial resources at the moment, appears 
promising.  
The Romanian example also shows that public housing policy in transition faces a dilemma 
between accepting lower-quality units or reaching a smaller market. Poland has tried to strike a 
compromise in that regard by promoting non-profit PPP rental housing (TBS), inspired mainly 
by the French social housing program HLM (Habitation à Loyer Modéré). The program was 
partly a response to obstinately high mortgage rates in the late 1990s, which implied 
prohibitively high down payments for middle-income households. The TBS system provides 
filtering-up incentives for these households: it offers a large improvement in housing utility 
relative to municipal stock through providing new rental units, but also requires beneficiaries to 
deposit “key-money” down payments and pay higher-than-usual rents. Old units vacated by new 
TBS dwellers will filter down, typically to the private rental market. While the general logic of 
the program is appealing - tapping private demand in a PPP model while generating low-cost 
units that filter down - the program appears excessively subsidized (see discussion below). 
Rent Levels and Affordability  
Private and Public Rent Levels 
Does the rental sector in the region make a contribution to more affordable housing? Private 
rental markets in transition countries are sharply divided into the small upscale market catering 38 
to corporations and foreigners, and the “popular” market for domestic tenants. We are mainly 
interested in the popular market in addressing this question.  
Both private and public sector data are hard to come by for this market.
60 Evaluations of new 
contract rents start with surveying rental ads and broker listings or holding interviews. Anecdotal 
evidence from such sources obtained during the study indicates new contract rents for one-room 
(studio) apartments starting from US$50 per month in Yerevan (Armenia), through US$100 in 
Vilnius and Bucharest, to US$250 in Warsaw and Moscow. More representative analysis in this 
direction was beyond the scope of this study. 
Table 9. Rents, Rent-to-Income and Cost-to-Income Ratios in Studied Countries 
 
  Armenia Poland  Romania  Russia* Serbia 
Rents in LCU           
- public  11000  154  200188  381  nil 
- private  15044  124  799487  646  4645 
Private/public 136.8%  80.5%  399.4%  169.6%  n.m. 
Rent-to-income**          
- public  23.1%  8.3%  4.7%  5.7%  nil 
- private  27.1%  7.3%  8.9%  9.7%  18.8% 
Private/public 117.5%  87.7%  188.1%  172.4%  n.m. 
Housing costs-to-income***           
- owners  11.0%  n/a  13.2%  17.4%  9.1% 
- public rental  34.3%  n/a  16.8%  17.6%  10.1% 
- private rental  35.5%  n/a 21.6%  19.4%  27.6% 
Private/public 103.4%  n/a  128.9%  110.1%  273.4% 
 
Source: Household surveys (Table 1).   
Note: Urban apartments only, housing bill excluding energy/heating. 
**Average rent payment divided by average income proxy value.  
***Average housing costs (rent/condominium fees + utilities) divided by average income proxy value.  
However, the results from the surveys (Table 9) provide a useful snapshot of average existing 
contract rents in the popular market. Since rent levels are derived from interviews with sitting 
tenants holding seasoned contracts, they reflect different contract originations (vintages) and will 
differ from current new contract rent levels. The difference between new and existing contract 
rent levels will be influenced by locally specific tenure durations and the presence or absence of 
rent controls. However, in cross-country comparisons, average rents do not seem to go too far 
astray from the anecdotal data on new rents.  
The exception is Poland, which is the only studied country exhibiting both lower private than 
public rents and significantly lower average rents than marginal (new contract) rents (Table 9). 
Private rents reflect a market-mimicking grading scale used by many municipalities for 
calculating rent ceilings below the overall ceiling of 3 percent of replacement costs, set by the 
central government. These grading scales are set less sensitive to location factors and more 
sensitive to the physical conditions of apartments and their buildings. Since the restituted prewar 
                                                 
60   Brokers and investment advisers offer rent information for the upscale market. This segment is left out of the 
study, as it is characterized by very specific and not representative supply and demand conditions. 39 
private rental stock is typically in worse physical condition and has fewer amenities and lower 
standards than the postwar municipal rental stock, the grading scales result in the lower average 
private rents.
61 This will be changing, however, with new regulations allowing substantial rent 
increases in this rental stock. 
In the uncontrolled markets of Romania and Russia, in contrast, private rents are both 
significantly higher than public rents and less affordable. Although distorting factors in the 
LSMS and HBS is a possibility - for example, strategic behavior of interviewees to conceal true 
rent levels because they might violate regulations or lead to higher taxation - we believe that 
these results by and large reflect the low quantities of rental housing supply in those countries 
determined earlier in the chapter.  
  The data for Romania confirm our evidence on the scarcity of rental housing supply -
especially in Bucharest. According to our interviews, for example, flats in public rental 
units in Bucharest in 2004 were let for just one-tenth of the rent level in the private 
market.  
  The data for Russia indicate somewhat lesser relative scarcity of private rental units than 
in Romania, but certainly still yield a high differential. This is consistent with both the 
findings of a low base effect concerning sector size reported in this study and the 
dynamics of new rental supply noted by Kalinina and Klepikova (2002). 
 
The countries of Armenia and Serbia are both in special situations: 
  The low mark-up for private rents in Armenia seems to reflect the combined effects of a 
lack of effective demand and a lack of net emigration, which leaves many units vacant. 
Low general affordability makes public rents appear very high - which they are not, if 
compared to costs.  
  Serbia has by definition the highest mark-up of private rents, because our survey does not 
record rent payments made for public rental apartments.  
It would be worthwhile to refine the results obtained by the LSMS and HBS by location or 
available information reflecting housing quality and tenant income. Such a hedonic pricing 
approach would lead to a greater accuracy about whether the matching of pricing and incomes 
works. Also, tracing rent levels over time would be important to test the interaction with the 
improving mortgage market conditions. However, the data presented here seem to provide an 
accurate snapshot of overall demand and supply conditions.  
Household Effort Ratios for Housing Expenditures 
Quite expectedly, our results indicate that households’ rent-to-income ratios are significantly 
higher in the private than in the public rental sector, with the exception of Poland. The gap for 
Romania is reduced somewhat by the fact that private tenants have higher average incomes than 
public tenants. For Russia and Armenia, the affordability relations reflect the price relations. 
                                                 
61   Although newly agreed contracts in these buildings, on vacated dwellings, are released from this rent setting 
regime. 40 
Gaps between private and public rental are reduced when considering energy costs. In Russia, for 
example, heating cost-to-income ratios for public tenants (at 4.6 percent) are significantly higher 
than for private tenants (3.8 percent). The effect is similarly pronounced in Romania. It must be 
left unresolved at this stage, whether private rental tenants simply spend less on heating, or 
whether their units are more energy efficient. Statistical errors typical for small sample size are a 
possibility, too. Additionally, rental contracts may include utilities within rental amounts. 
Armenia and Serbia - the two countries with the highest poverty evidence among the studied 
countries - show the highest absolute rent-to-income ratios for private rental units.  
Relative to income levels, private rental housing tenure throughout the region is considerably 
less affordable than “privatized” ownership, which gives a clue of the size of the windfall - at 
least in current cash payment terms - that sitting tenants were given through the privatization. 
However, private rental is still relatively affordable compared with urban rent-to-income or 
housing cost-to-income burdens in Western Europe, where effort ratios of 15–20 percent (net of 
energy and heating) are typically found. Public rental housing is generally very inexpensive 
relative to income—with the exception of Armenia, for the reason discussed above - and most 
affordable in Romania and Russia. 
Affordability and Profitability of Renting 
The findings on affordability seem to be at variance with popular notions of the high profitability 
of informal renting (Box 1). The perception of highly profitable private rental entrepreneurship 
in the region is biased toward cases of metropolitan cities with extreme demand conditions. Such 
perception problems are exacerbated by the stories of tenants in new municipal apartments who 
can quickly privatize, turn around, and sublet their units at market rents. 
Considering the survey data that reflect broader urban area definitions and landlord categories, 
and contrasting current rent levels with investment return requirements, the picture of high 
profitability softens considerably. Lithuania may be more characteristic for the rental 
profitability trend in the region: according to brokers interviewed, rents in Vilnius have been 
stagnating since about 2001, owing to an increasing supply in both the upscale and the popular 
rental markets. Apartment prices nevertheless have risen, fuelled by the expanding mortgage 
market that experienced falling interest rates and generous homeownership subsidies. In 
combination with rising prices and stagnating rents, private rental yields have dropped.  
As mortgage markets in the region have started to swiftly expand, broadening homeownership 
affordability, filtering up into the owner-occupied market should steadily increase. The 




Box 1. Informal Renting in Russia 
A recently privatized owner in a typical Russian apartment block is paying the municipality an equivalent 
of $50 a month. This is composed in 80 percent of utility payments, 50 percent of that for heating. The 
residual 20 percent is paid as a maintenance fee to the municipal housing management company. Most of 
that is a subsidized user fee, and only a tiny fraction is charged as a pure rent. Once the owner turns 
around and rents the apartment to a private tenant, the rent rises to US$400 a month, with the owner still 
paying US$50 to the municipality, while receiving the difference, US$350, as a profit. This calculation is 
free of taxes, since this economic activity is not reported as taxable income and tax authorities are not 
pursuing these incomes. The relationship between utility payments and rent now become more 
comparable with the economic rental model found in mature market economies, where rents are 
significantly higher than utility payments. In this instance utility payments constitute only 10 percent of 




4.  REGIONAL TENURE CHOICE POLICIES 
Rental Housing Investor Categories  
Developed rental markets are characterized by a mix of private “amateur” typically informal, 
private “professional” typically formal, and public rental housing investors. Scaling up capacity 
by motivating a variety of investor types with different management and financial structures has 
been a key mechanism for generating investment in those markets. The policy analysis begins by 
identifying the main investor categories in the studied countries and analyzing their economic 
incentives and disincentives.  
Private Amateur Investors 
Subsistence landlords are typically cash income-poor owners or tenants, frequently unemployed 
or retired, renting out their own unit or individual rooms in it.  
Restitution beneficiaries exhibit very heterogeneous cash income status. Given the restrictions of 
restitution laws in transition countries, which generally exempted or capped restitution of large 
estates, portfolio size is typically limited to a single or few buildings. Often, beneficiaries are 
heirs of prewar owners who exhibit heterogeneous interests. Tenant protection legislation forced 
them to become rental landlords by taking over tenanted buildings.
62 Frequently, the restituted 
rental units are sold onward to small private landlords or to professional landlord-investors. 
Small private landlords are usually cash income-rich and accumulated small portfolios on the 
secondary market for privatized apartments during the period of low and moderate prices in the 
early 1990s, for trading or for generating investment and retirement income. They include 
restitution beneficiaries who grew organically into portfolio investors. Such investors typically 
own small numbers of dispersed dwellings or, less frequently, whole rental buildings, purchased 
from restitution beneficiaries. 
All three investor categories are typically part of the shadow economy in the studied countries, 
operating informally from the tax perspective and often even without contracts. An exception is 
Poland, which has a low degree of tax evasion (see below). A “passive” small private landlord 
market investing for tax shelter purposes, very active in many Western European countries, has 
not yet emerged to any significant degree. 
Private Professional Investors 
Emerging from the two previous categories, professional private landlords have appeared in the 
more advanced markets in the region (Poland and Lithuania in the study). They hold mid-sized 
rental housing portfolios for permanent investment and current income generation. The main 
group of professional landlords chooses the legal form of a small business, such as a sole 
proprietorship or a limited partnership, to limit liability and secure the ability to deduct capital 
                                                 
62   Typically, restitution allows the beneficiary to claim vacant possession of some apartments for family use. 43 
costs from rental revenue under the corporate income tax code (where this is allowed). Such 
investors usually bought inexpensive units at the secondary market with their equity funds.  
Rental housing and hostel accommodation provided by employers is also a relevant sub-sector in 
Russia, where natural resources companies and the national railroad company continue to 
provide housing on an extensive scale. The “landlords” in these cases are mostly private 
corporations that for tax purposes net out losses from renting against other profits.  
Institutional investors in the rental sector hold properties for permanent investment purposes and 
often also develop property themselves. The small market consists usually of domestic 
construction companies that gradually evolve into property holding companies, sometimes in 
joint ventures with international investors, operating under the corporate income tax code. Box 2 
provides examples from Poland and Russia. Institutional ownership of residential properties by 
insurance companies and pension funds is still largely unknown. In the professional market, 
rental contracts mostly exist and are submitted to the tax offices. Formality is particularly 
important for contracts with corporations or with foreigners as tenants, who seek both legal and 
tax protection and typically use brokers that offer standardized contracts.   
Non-profit and Public Investors 
Non-profit rental. Non-profit (or limited profit) rental investors include housing cooperatives, 
charities and churches, and PPP models. Cooperatives concentrate in the postwar urban stock 
while charities and churches are often beneficiaries of restitution of older stock. Public-private 
partnership models are relatively new and deal with the construction of new apartment stock. 
The tax treatment of these investor types is quite heterogeneous, even in mature markets. 
Although a full survey was beyond the scope of this study, it appears that members of 
cooperatives in the region tend to be taxed solely under the personal income tax code for rental 
revenues (usually of their individual units, rented out with the consent but not the economic 
involvement of the cooperative), while charities and churches are often tax free. In the PPP 
model of TBS in Poland the municipality, as the public partner, may remain the owner for legal 
and tax purposes, until property ownership is transferred to the user after 15–20 years. Other 
variants of TBS may see private partners dominating the ownership structure. The TBS lessor 
signs formal leases, while many cooperative members renting out their units do not. 
Box 2. Emerging Institutional Investor Market in Rental Properties 
First efforts an institutional investor market in income-generating residential properties were observed in 
Poland, where the state insurance company PZU has formed a real estate subsidiary to hold and develop 
income-producing properties. In Moscow the main corporate developer is UPDK, which grew out of the 
Soviet-era company that used to service the residential needs of the diplomatic corps and other foreigners. 
The company was privatized with sufficient asset and financial resources, allowing it to make rental 
building investments, which take years to return the capital invested. Still, given the tight market, the 
UPDK is charging very high rents, which allow for a faster return of capital. 44 
Public rental. After the privatization and “communalization” waves, the public owners in the 
region are today overwhelmingly local governments.
63 Public companies, which are now 
incorporated and taxed as corporations, have also remained owners of apartment stock.
64 Public 
owners have generally retained the government-built, postwar, often large-panel, prefabricated 
housing stock. Rental contracts in the public sector are in writing and are subject to taxation (for 
example, corporate taxation in the case of public incorporated companies). However, in countries 
with marginalized public rental stock, rent evasion is frequent and often occupants are not even 
registered.  
Table 10. Rental Investor Categories and Activity Levels 
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Source: Authors’ assessment based on literature review, information from market participants, and household 
surveys (Table 1) results.  
                                                 
63   Through communalization state housing was typically transferred to municipalities, which then decided on the 
extent of privatization (if allowed by law) or which carried out state-mandated privatization (if imposed by law). 
64   Especially natural resource companies in Russia. 45 
Financial Leverage Investors 
Private (mortgage) debt / leveraged financing of rental projects is available in the region through 
bank lending to professional private landlords, especially in the fast-growing mortgage markets 
of Lithuania and Poland, and increasingly in Romania and Russia. Most mortgage lenders, owing 
to lack of experience, have not yet started to differentiate their underwriting between 
investment
65 and owner occupation, which should imply favorable initial interest rate conditions 
for leveraged investors of income-producing real estate. Some, however, have begun to look at 
rental projects proposals as part of commercial lending through their corporate departments 
rather than through residential mortgage lending. Mortgage finance plays a significant role in 
Poland, where both cooperatives and the TBS system have access to long-term loans for 
financing new construction with public guarantees. There is still very little public financing in 
the residential sector, with the exception of a few international open property funds active in the 
main urban centers in upscale apartment construction. 
Table 10 summarizes the assessment. Interpreted jointly with our LSMS/HBS results presented 
in Table 3 it suggests that greater professionalism and activity of private investors develops in 
tandem with the size of the private rental market. An important determining factor for both to 
which we turn now is the legal, regulatory and tax framework for rental investment. 
Legal, Regulatory, and Taxation Frameworks 
Governing Laws and Regulations 
The civil code is typically the main source of law governing contracts, including specific 
provisions on rental agreements. In the studied countries, however, specific sections on 
residential rentals exist only in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia. The Armenian, Romanian, and 
Serbian civil codes either do not contain relevant sections or make only cursory reference to 
rental relationships.
66 Because of the undeveloped legal framework, most private rental 
relationships are governed by contractual provisions, with recourse to common courts in case of 
dispute. Needless to say this way of regulation is quite inefficient, protracted and uncertain. 
Contract Establishment, Terms, and Enforcement 
Intermediation, Formulation, and Recording of Rental Agreements  
In the low- and middle-income rental market, the predominant intermediating mechanisms are 
newspapers and the Internet.
67 Rental housing brokers are rather infrequent in this market, as are 
formal individual contracts. Nevertheless, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Russia have active 
residential broker markets, which cover rental dwellings. Rental brokers serve typically the 
upscale private rental market for such clientele as young professionals, managers, and foreigners. 
Given the typical short lease terms, brokerage fees are between one month’s rent (Lithuania, 
                                                 
65 The terms “private” and “public” in relation to debt investment refer to the tradability of the claim rather than the 
identity of the holder of the claim. Bonds are public debt, while loans are private debt. 
66  For more information see Annex 1. 
67  Rental housing demand is mostly expressed by young households who prefer using the Internet. 46 
Romania) and half a month’s rent (Poland, Russia). Only in Poland are real estate brokers 
licensed after having completed a considerable course and practice work and having passed both 
written and oral exams, and they also need to be insured. International brokers, who are active in 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Russia mostly in office and retail markets, are gradually 
entering the upscale residential rental market. Residential brokerage in Serbia and Armenia is 
still in its infancy and largely informal. 
The civil codes generally require written forms for longer-term contracts, and sometimes for all 
rental contracts.
68 In practice, with the preponderance of subsistence and small-scale landlords, 
contracts are overwhelmingly either in oral or rudimentary written form. Brokered contracts, 
however, are usually in writing, mainly to protect the broker’s fee. Brokers also provide third-
party legal advice services to landlords and tenants on contract formulation. However, this does 
not imply any additional step of legalization.  
Various ways are used to record the existence of a rental relationship. The main purposes of 
formalization are legal security for both parties to the agreement; evidence about the existence of 
the agreement for third parties, such as banks; and compliance with duties imposed by the 
government, most notably rent and income taxes. There is only anecdotal evidence on the level 
of formality in the studied countries. Using taxation as a formality indicator, contracts are 
generally informal in Armenia and Serbia, as well as for subsistence landlords in the remaining 
countries.  
There is no universal trend toward formalizing contracts. Anecdotal evidence for Russia suggests 
that an increasing clampdown by the tax authorities on tax evasion has led landlords to avoid and 
even destroy written rental contracts that could serve as evidence. In contrast, after the reduction 
of the rental tax rate in Romania, anecdotal evidence suggests increasing formalization there.
69 
Similarly, Lithuanian landlords have reacted to more favorable tax treatment with increased 
registration. In Poland there is both an informal market with unreported micro rentals and a 
significant number of landlords of formal rental apartment buildings, which are tax registered.  
Rental Definition, Term, and Deposit  
Market practice indicates the use of security deposits in the amount of one to three months’ rent, 
depending on the contract term (not regulated in the studied countries). The Polish civil code 
gives landlords a statutory right of pledge on movable objects in the apartment belonging to the 
tenant, which is a quasi-deposit. Public landlords in the region typically require nominal security 
deposits in their public rental contracts. 
Given the scarcity of regulations there is a sharp distinction between private and public rental 
arrangements concerning lease terms. In private rentals they are typically short—between 6 and 
                                                 
68   Lithuania and Poland: for contracts longer than one year; Romania: for all contracts. 
69  Because of stronger controls by tax authorities and an improved level of legal security provided to the landlord, 
through registration with the tax offices, in case of title dispute and litigation. 47 
12 months, with rollover extensions subject to mutual agreement.
 70 Often, however, tenants are 
protected by the right of extension over potential new tenants, or shielded from rent increases 
during roll-over (as in Poland). This protection holds only for formalized rental agreements, 
which partly explains informality. Public lease terms are usually permanent or fixed term, as 
determined by law (Lithuania, Romania: five years), subject to review of eligibility criteria 
(Romania: income).  
As in the case of mortgage finance, the economic value of the term of the lease for the tenant 
depends on the capacity of the landlord to review rents during the tenancy. Short contract 
maturities give the landlord an option to limit such market risk in an environment of economic 
and - as far as the private rental sector is concerned - additional legal uncertainty. Longer lease 
terms have therefore only recently become popular, as both the macroeconomic and employment 
situations have improved (especially in Romania and Russia). 
In the private rental sector, triple net rents (net of maintenance, heating and utilities) are the 
standard in the studied countries. The civil code in Russia forces the formal tenant to pay utilities 
directly in case of formalized renting. However, utility and heating providers often refuse to deal 
with the credit risk for short-term tenants and charge the owners and/or managers, who in turn 
charge the tenants at the end of the month. This may lead to complications; in Romania and 
Lithuania, for example, the owner must prepay the tenant’s telephone bills, raising considerably 
the credit risk for the landlord. By contrast, while utility payments in Romania are typically 
made by the landlord, in Lithuania they are typically made by the tenant (other than phone bills). 
Notice and Sale 
Legislation in the studied countries generally allows for only one-month notice periods for term 
contracts for both landlords and tenants, which is in line with informal market practice 
(Lithuania, Poland, Russia). Permanent contracts, however, can be terminated by landlords only 
subject to special circumstances, with typical notice periods for the tenant being three months 
(Lithuania). Public rental contract termination is generally defined by pertinent regulations. 
A legal principle widely held in Roman law determines that a sale does not break a lease. This 
principle is incorporated in civil code rental provisions in the studied countries, although in 
Serbia, some legal uncertainty remains. The Lithuanian civil code leaves tenants with 
unregistered or verbal contracts unprotected. However, tenants may take a change of ownership 
as a special ground for giving notice. 
Payment Default and Enforcement 
Rent payments in the popular micro-rental market are usually made in cash, which raises 
payment security and technical default issues. Wire transfers and bank deposit payments exist in 
exceptional cases at the high end of the market in the region; in Poland and Lithuania it is more 
                                                 
70  This market result resembles the traditional Anglo-Saxon rental contract, which still dominates the United States 
and large parts of the rental sector in the United Kingdom, and has been confirmed through decades of common 
law practice.  48 
common practice. In-kind payments are allowed by several civil codes and seem to be practiced 
in the poorer countries of the study (Armenia, Serbia). 
Where formally regulated, arrears and eviction procedures are similar to the treatment of 
defaulting mortgage borrowers. Mortgage enforcement has been the subject of frequent reviews 
(in the literature) and political initiative for change. Civil codes define rent defaults after two 
missing rent payments (Lithuania, Russia). Arrears penalty payments are often found in formal 
rental contracts, but their enforceability is not clear. In practice, the enforcement of arrears 
payments is very difficult in the public sector. Eviction possibilities often exist under one law 
(civil code, housing) and are disallowed by another law (social protection). Where eviction is 
possible, a court order is generally required. This allows tenants to use delaying tactics and 
imposes high management costs on landlords. Court rulings often require that a replacement 
dwelling be offered (by the municipality), which defeats the purpose of eviction and puts 
additional strain on municipalities that have lost most of their social housing stock through 
privatization and are still grappling with long waiting lists for social housing. 
Where legislation exists in the region, the only defined conflict settlement mechanism is judicial. 
None of the countries reviewed has an extrajudicial, low-cost arbitration or mediation 
mechanism such as ombudsmen, rental tribunals, or quick claims courts. 
Rent Determination 
Rent Determination for New and Existing Contracts  
In all studied countries, rent levels for new private contracts are in practice determined by 
negotiation. With the exception of Poland, however, legal uncertainty about the lawfulness of 
this practice remains significant. Natural tenant fluctuations (migration, death, acquisition of a 
flat or single-family house) have created an increasing number of “new” contracts in a legal 
sense. Although there is no explicit survey data, anecdotal evidence from Krakow (Poland) 
suggests that by 2004 most private rental contracts were not more than 10 years old.
71  
Because of the lack of specific rent legislation, and beyond the legal caveats made above for new 
rental contracts for Romania and Poland, contracts in the private rental sector have also not 
become specifically protected.  The important exception is the case of restituted properties, 
sometimes referred to as “denationalized” housing. In all the countries reviewed, restitution 
programs of varying scope took place and occupiers in restituted buildings were given tenant 
status. Usually, the privatization laws predated the restitution laws, giving legal title to the 
occupiers’ tenancy claim and the right to the same rent levels as in municipal rental housing or 
special rent control regimes (Romania).  
Contrary to the private rental regulations, public rent setting usually differentiates between new 
and existing buildings rather than between new and existing contracts, which are treated in a 
homogeneous way. Some new public rental construction has taken place, which has led to 
                                                 
71    Private professional landlords have successively been replacing the administrative allocation decisions, held by 
tenants before restitution of rental buildings, with civil code contracts at negotiated rental rates. 49 
various ways of setting the rent level. One way is to mix investment costs and rent schedules 
with additional deductions for income testing (Lithuania). Another way is to apply a certain rate 
to replacement cost, which may be different for municipal housing (1–1.5 percent in Poland) and 
for publicly sponsored non-profit housing (4 percent in Poland). Yet another way is the solely 
income-tested rent (Romania).   
As for the public sector buildings, public landlords throughout the studied countries generally are 
bound by specific and frequently changing governmental rent regulations. Where the public 
rental sector today is purely residual (Armenia, Lithuania, Serbia) rents are often not charged 
(but utility and maintenance costs are) or not collected. In other countries one finds a mixture of 
rent ceilings and rent increase caps (Poland), income-tested rent controls (Romania), and some 
movement toward using the cost-coverage principle (Russia). The lack of full cost recovery in 
those countries has led municipalities to cover shortfalls though cross-subsidization with 
incomes from commercial premises owned by them. A more drastic way to balance municipal 
budgets has been to let the housing stock partly decapitalize by deferring maintenance and 
capital repairs. 
Rent Review 
In the popular “micro market” dominated by domestic low- and middle-income tenants renting 
privatized apartments from individuals, rents are paid in local currency, although in longer-term 
contracts or upon renewal they may be indexed to a foreign currency (EUR or USD). In some 
cases these currency-based rents may be indexed to inflation.
72  
Free unilateral rent review by the landlord upon roll-over or fixed-term contract renewal or 
extension is generally allowed for private rental contracts, unless they conflict with rent control 
provisions (Poland, Romania). Where regulations exist, reviews in permanent contracts can take 
place only semi-annually (Lithuania) or longer. Rents in fixed-term contracts usually can not be 
unilaterally reviewed, unless that option is explicitly stated in the contract (explicit ban in 
Russia). 
There is de facto indexation of rents, but apart from the explicitly rent-controlled systems, formal 
protection of tenants against excessive rent increases upon contract renewal or extension (except 
in Poland) does not seem to exist. Actual landlord practice of using this degree of freedom varies 
with the market control they wield at a given time.
73  
                                                 
72    Indexation by real housing cost parameters (such as indexation to house price or construction cost indexes) is 
not common. Also, step-up rental agreements are hardly practiced. 
73    Interviews in Lithuania suggest that tenants are seldom aware of the option to close longer term contracts with 
fixed rents, rather than short-term rollover contracts.  50 
Capital Repairs 
Capital repairs are generally a duty of the landlord.
74 A tenant in Lithuania who is forced to 
undertake capital repairs has the civil code right to deduct the costs from his rent payment. 
Landlords in Lithuania and Romania who undertake capital repairs can demand temporary 
suspension of the lease and provide substitute housing. Rent review after capital repairs, 
however, is not generally regulated. It seems possible, given the currently liberal context of rent 
reviews for short-term contracts; however, the potential scale of capital repairs renders future 
court intervention quite likely. 
Our assessment of the legal framework for renting is compiled in Table 11. The jurisdictions 
with the most advanced private rental sector, Poland and Lithuania, have the more complete legal 
frameworks, as well as Russia which recently reformed its Housing Code dealing mostly with 
social rental housing. Interestingly, the quality of the rent adjustment and eviction processes are 
less correlated to rental sector depth than what would be a priori expected. 
Table 11. Summary of Rental Laws in the Studied Countries 
 
  Armenia Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Serbia 
 
Governing law             
Main legal 
reference 



















Main issues             
Lease terms used 













Rent setting in 
new contracts 
(private/public)? 










Public rent control 
option? 
 
Unclear Yes  (not 
practiced) 













No No  Unclear 
                                                 
74   Civil codes of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia. 51 
 
  Armenia Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Russia  Serbia 
 
Eviction
b Legally  and 
in practice 
not possible 












Irrelevant  No; yes, in 
households 
with children 
Legally no; in 
practice, yes 
(courts) 




Source: Authors’ representation.   
a. Within current contract term.  
b. In case of nonpayment of rent. 
Taxation  
General Income Tax Treatment 
The income tax treatment of rental housing is a crucial policy parameter that affects relative 
prices between rental and owner-occupied tenures and hence the profitability of investment and 
rent levels. As discussed in more depth in Annex 1, the commercial character of private rental 
housing activity has led most Western countries to pursue an investment concept of income 
taxation, which allows landlords to deduct costs from rental revenues before being taxed on 
them. This is generally not the case in the studied countries, with the exception of Poland (Figure 
10). The current income taxation concepts applied to rental housing thus generally violate tenure 
neutrality and provide disincentives to modernize or invest in new rental construction.
75 
Figure 10 also compares the treatment of a private renter with that of a homeowner with 
mortgage debt. In all four countries, mortgage interest payments are tax-deductible - sometimes 
within limits - while the rental value of living in an owned unit (imputed rent) is not. This creates 
an asymmetry of tax treatment both in the owner-occupied sector (because revenues are not 
taxed while costs are deductible) and between the mortgage and the rental sector (where 
revenues are taxed, but costs are not deductible—except in Poland). The result is, for a given 
investment amount, a relative increase of rents relative to the costs of owner-occupied housing. 
When investing in new rental housing or major modernizations, initial net incomes for landlords 
are typically negative, because the sum of capital costs incurred for investments and operating 
costs exceeds rental revenues. As the investment seasons, the situation usually reverses and net 
income becomes positive. The tax system may help, or discourage, investors in such a situation. 
In the studied countries it is not possible to net negative income from letting against other 
sources of income or to carry negative income forward as a loss to reduce future taxable income. 
Poland allows carry forward of negative income, but not netting. Netting is a particularly 
important mechanism for small private landlords who have other sources of income against 
which to write off losses from renting but do not possess sufficient numbers of properties whose 
individual loss and profit situations cancel each other out. 
                                                 
75   More country-specific information is included in the Annex 1. 52 
 
Figure 10. Income Tax Treatment of Homeowners and Small Landlords in Selected 
Countries 
Homeowners Landlords Homeowners Landlords
Rent/imputed rent TT Rent/imputed rent NT T
Costs of capital TT Costs of capital NT T
Homeowners Landlords Homeowners Landlords
Rent/imputed rent NT T Rent/imputed rent NT T
Costs of capital TN T Costs of capital TT
Homeowners Landlords Homeowners Landlords
Rent/imputed rent NT T Rent/imputed rent NT T
Costs of capital TN T Costs of capital TN T
Romania Russia
Tenure Neutral* Consistent within Sector
Lithuania Poland
 
Source: Authors’ representation.  
Notes: T = taxed/tax-deductible, NT = not taxed/tax-deductible.  
* Good investment concept. 
 
Income Tax Incentives for Modernizing/Upgrading 
Special incentives for modernizations for the rental sector in the studied countries are currently 
limited to Poland. While the housing market reform of 2001 abandoned the tax credit system for 
owner-occupiers, private rental investors were allowed to continue to use tax credits for 
modernization costs incurred in rental units. Up to 19 percent of the costs can be netted against 
the tax liability, up to certain cost ceilings per square meter. However, considering the effects of 
past rent controls and proposed caps on rent increases on deferred maintenance, the scale of the 
support is widely held to be insufficient.
76  
                                                 
76   Access to soft modernization (upgrading) loans is provided by the government’s development bank BGK, but it 
is reported to be difficult for private investors. These loans are related mostly to energy efficiency 
improvements on a larger scale, since energy audit and engineering design work is expensive for individual 
buildings. 53 
Other Taxes 
As in most Western jurisdictions, residential leases in the studied countries are exempt from 
value added tax (VAT). Exceptions are commercial and short-term residential leases that appear 
as commercial - such as hotel accommodation services (Lithuania applies a two-month limit, 
below which renting services are subject to VAT). Also, new construction and modernization 
(upgrading) of housing units is frequently value added tax–preferred (Poland, Lithuania) or 
exempt (Romania). A detailed review of this issue is beyond the scope of this study; however, 
examples in the owner-occupied sector suggest that capital gains and property sales taxation on 
rental units are very heterogeneous.  
Tax Evasion and Enforcement  
A major reason for tax evasion is inadequate enforcement on tax-informal subsistence micro 
letting, which is not pursued effectively in any of the studied countries, and small private 
landlords so far have been generally evading taxation. However, anecdotal evidence presented 
above suggests that with the rising relevance of the sector tax authorities in Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and particularly Russia have started to tighten their controls.  
Formulation of Tenure Policy 
Historic Background 
Industrialization and World War I 
Private rental housing was the workhorse of the housing sector in the industrialization phase after 
1850. By the turn of the XIX
th and XX
th Centuries, cities in Central and Eastern Europe had 
private rental shares in the order of 70 percent and larger (more than 90 percent in Budapest). 
Private land and building developers dominated the development market; large individual 
landlords provided standing investment finance for residential properties. The appearance of 
cities in the region - contiguous city enlargements through new apartment blocks is inextricably 
linked to this private sector dominated development and finance process. It promoted a 
successful combination of high project density and scale fit to host workers for the industrial 
urban economy. However, the very success of the urban economy also attracted large numbers of 
rural migrants, resulting in overcrowding. As in other European countries, the war effort led to 
diversion of capital, reduced real incomes, and - given strong population growth rates - extreme 
housing scarcity. In only five years, between 1917 and 1922, almost all European countries 
introduced rent controls. 
Interwar Period and World War II 
In the inter-war period, the non-socialist economies safeguarded the property rights of private 
rental investors, but - in the light of revolutions in Russia and Germany that threatened to spill 
over to all Europe - lifted rent controls only gradually and selectively and started to promote 
member-owned cooperative and employer housing, as well as public rental housing projects in 
some isolated cases. Public rental received absolute priority in Western European housing 
policies in the first three decades after World War II, which were characterized by the most 
extreme housing shortage in history of many parts of Europe.  54 
Socialist Soviet Legacy 
The socialist Soviet experiment started in 1917 in Bolshevik Russia and consolidated its grip on 
the region after 1945. The discrimination against private rental housing was a political hallmark 
of socialist ideology: private rental was considered a key mechanism of exploitation of the 
working class by capitalist landlords, and consequently became either legally prohibited (Russia, 
Lithuania, Armenia) or economically destroyed through expropriations, hard rent control, and 
unfair regulations (Poland, Romania, Serbia). Socialist Soviet housing policy was biased toward 
promoting tenure exclusively in public rental housing and non-member-owned housing 
cooperatives. The thrust was particularly strong after World War II, which left Central and 
Eastern Europe with destroyed cities and millions of refugees. Owner-occupied detached 
housing, in contrast, while economically disadvantaged with few exceptions (Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria), remained permitted and developed into the main tenure alternative to a public housing 
industry constrained by centrally planned resources. However, urban structure, infrastructure, 
and construction resources remained tightly controlled, which put brakes on the owner-occupied 
sector.  
Immediate Transition Phase 
Immediate Transition Phase 
The main argument behind the privatization drive that characterized the regional housing 
markets after 1989/91 (except in Poland) - was to render popular support for transition 
irreversible by creating nations of homeowners with vested interests in the reforms. The 
promotion of detached housing homeownership, particularly through mortgage market 
development, with less stringent condominium associations in the M-F stock, became the central 
policy lemma. It coincided with a retreat of social housing programs, a wave of privatizations of 
social housing stock, and a hardening political debate over the role of government in housing 
policy in the West. 
Western political interests and constraints dominating external technical assistance played a key 
role in housing policy formulation in the transition countries. The financially best endowed and 
most focused sponsor of technical assistance in housing and local government affairs since 
1989/91 has been USAID, whose housing policy agenda is strongly nested in a political 
environment that historically prioritizes homeownership. The European Union, which would 
have been a geographically and politically more natural partner with lesser constraints about 
tenure choice, has been forced to largely ignore transition country housing sectors because of its 
constraints in mandate.
77 To avoid a second source of large subsidies following the agricultural 
sector, the EU Treaty explicitly leaves housing policy to the ambit of the subsidiary.
78 Bilateral 
European assistance has been financially more limited and frequently suffered from a more 
blurred sectoral focus, compared with U.S. assistance. 
                                                 
77   Housing issues and policy is left to member countries and thus is not subject of EU directives. 
78   Annual meetings of EU housing ministers are held for information exchange purposes. There is no Directorate-
General directly responsible for the housing sector. 55 
The empirical outcome of this political focus was discussed in Chapter 3. It is now widely 
accepted that the thrust to promote individual ownership overlooked important economic aspects 
of the housing sector, particularly the structure of tenure and labor demand and issues of 
apartment stock management.
79, 80 More disputed is whether these costs were justified in 
transition countries.
81 Similarly, it is disputable to what extent actual capital value was 
transferred to sitting tenants with the units. In hindsight, an alternative interpretation seems 
equally plausible: central governments used the ideological umbrella to abandon what promised 
to become an economic problem sector, leaving the solution to the new owners and local 
governments.
82  
This unilateral focus on privatization resulted in some withdrawal and a substantial weakening of 
housing policy formulation capacities at the central government level. This gave room for the 
emergence of usually untargeted subsidies lobbied for by construction and finance interests. It 
led to a severe delay in enacting cross-sectoral policies needed to diversify investor structure and 
create tenure-neutral investment incentives. Similarly, the parallel processes of housing 
communalization and restitution received little attention and in the case of restitution ended in 
some disarray.
83 And finally, housing production plummeted during the first 10 years of 
transition to levels that threatened labor mobility and the overall economic outcome of 
transition.
84 
Rethinking Housing Policy 
Since the mid-1990s, several transition countries, especially in Central Europe, had launched a 
more diversified post-privatization housing policy debate and begun to formulate programs 
pursuing broader housing choice for diverse household categories, which included less tenure 
bias towards homeownership.
85 These had broadly the following elements:  
                                                 
79   See Maclennan (2001) on the outcome of the U.K. privatization experience for tenure choice. 
80   UN-Habitat (2003) makes a similar point in the context of tenure choice in developing countries. The report 
addresses several policy myths about the rental sector from the past decades. 
81   For example, did the privatization strategy further its goal of creating political stability? Contrasting the Polish 
and the Russian experience with diametrically opposed privatization strategies would seem to speak against a 
positive answer. 
82   Little research supports the circulating figure of US$1 trillion of wealth transfer (World Bank 2004a) because 
common property was not privatized and net asset values of privatized units were not based on future 
income/expenditures and expected building life. Anecdotal evidence of low and negative values abounds.  
83   Three major problems arose with restitution: use rights of sitting tenants were protected by rent controls 
(Romania, Poland); investment was impeded when a property was restituted to a mix of heterogenous heirs; the 
court system and other public entities lacked capacity to manage the process. Dübel (1996) describes these 
interacting problems in eastern Germany. 
84   From the perspective of socioeconomic development, more new construction is needed to address the statistical 
deficit; the misfit between housing stock and households; the secular trend toward smaller households; the 
physical replacement imperative; the demand for higher product diversity; and factor mobility. 
85   See Dübel (2004) for a review of Central European housing policies. 56 
  On the supply side, the legal framework was amended by laws enabling member-owned 
cooperatives and new public-private construction models (Poland).
86 Attempts to 
complete overall rent reforms remained unsuccessful, mainly owing to politics and 
populism at local government levels.
87 
  Similarly, public funding mechanisms for modernizing / upgrading and construction of 
M-F buildings were provided through central government public housing or guarantee 
funds (Poland, Romania).
88 These partly also target private rental landlords.
89 Some cities 
began assisting private landlords with necessary renovations, especially in historic 
properties.
90 
  In the most direct form of intervention, public rental housing construction was revived at 
municipal level (Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia),
91 with the support of central 
government funding mechanisms. However, production volumes have remained low and 
subsidy costs per beneficiary high.  
  In Poland, the government recognized the need for more private rental housing and 
offered very generous subsidies to private investors who acquired new rental housing. 
The program was ended after a few years, when it was found that the subsidies were 
being capitalized partly by developers and partly by investors, who were looking for 
subsidized homeownership disguised as rental housing.
92 
  On the demand side, attempts were made to strengthen purchasing power of low-income 
entrants through rent allowance programs (Poland, Russia). At the same time, weak or 
untargeted owner-occupied housing subsidies were cut back, as the mortgage market 
started to take off after 2002 after successful macroeconomic stabilization (Poland).
93 
Most assistance schemes remain insufficiently funded and suffer from targeting 
problems, though.
94 
  Consolidation of public housing policy budgets took place. Budgets eventually reached 
very low levels (in Central Europe), at levels of 0.3–0.9 percent of GDP, but this did not 
mean rationalization and did not expose numerous indirect and implicit subsidies not 
                                                 
86   See Lux (2001). Also: Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
87   Rent policy competencies are typically held by local municipal councils, which are captive to highly populist 
rhetoric. These competencies include not only tenants’ rents, but also owners’ maintenance fees charged by 
municipal maintenance companies to privatized tenants. 
88   Also: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia. 
89   For example, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
90   Such a program was introduced, for example, in Cracow, in the late 1990s. 
91   Also: Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
92  Developers were formulating special agreements wherein the dwellings were first rented on the market, but later 
occupied by their individual owners. 
93   Also: Czech Republic, Slovakia. Hungary transitionally expanded mortgage market subsidies but is currently 
reviewing its policy.  
94   Lux (2002) provides a recent comparative analysis of Central European housing allowance systems. 57 
included in these figures. Large old subsidies and some new subsidies to the housing 
sector are channeled through ministries of finance (housing finance subsidies, tax 
support) or ministries of labor and social affairs (housing allowances, utility cost 
compensation, welfare), as well as in the form of implicit subsidies through local budgets 
(below- cost municipal rents and maintenance fees). 
Reviewing Central European housing policy reforms Dübel (2004) concludes that even the most 
advanced countries execute housing policies with substantial inefficiency. Housing policy 
formulation and external policy evaluation capacity has not yet been firmly established, leading 
to erratic changes in policy focus and the absence of cost-benefit or tenure-impact analysis. Also, 
many new policies introduced in those countries were triggered by political pump-priming 
efforts arising from frustration with the recessionary impact of high inflation (Poland) or weak 
demand (Czech Republic). However, the fact that policy menus have become increasingly 
diversified, embracing larger private sector participation - and that budgets have been stabilized - 
must be seen as positive and meriting further policy dialogue and technical support.  
Present Tenure Policies 
Status in the Studied Countries 
By 2004 four of the six studied countries appeared determined to make further and more 
conscious progress toward less homeownership-biased housing tenure choice in their housing 
policy debates. Apart from the Polish case
95 these are Lithuania, Romania, and Russia. At this 
stage no consistent comparative program analysis for transition countries is available, especially 
with reference to budgets, cost-benefit analysis, and subsidy dependency analysis. Follow-up 
work is needed to expand the knowledge base in this area. Following are the strategies 
formulated by the studied country governments: 
  Armenia adopted a housing policy framework in 1999 that prioritized improved housing 
management, housing stock modernization, and emergency provision of housing in the 
earthquake zone.
96 Changing rental housing legislation and developing a national housing 
allowance system are central to the agenda of the Ministry of Urban Development, 
mainly to increase cost recovery levels. Moreover, local governments are trying to 
consolidate their scattered apartment stock through various measures. The housing policy 
budget is unlikely to allow for an expansive rental sector strategy soon. 
  With assistance of the World Bank, Lithuania formulated and adopted a comprehensive 
national housing strategy giving an important role to rental sector development.
97 The 
strategy report of 2002 and the final document of 2004 stress the importance of the sector 
                                                 
95   Polish housing policy is analyzed in detail from the Central European perspective in Lux (2002) and Dübel 
(2004). 
96   See Dübel and Freinkman (1999) and UN-ECE (2004c).  
97   On January 21, 2004 the Government of Lithuania adopted Resolution No. 60 “On Approval of the Lithuanian 
Housing Strategy”. In Section 13 it stated that “… housing rental market does not exist”, and in Section 45 with 
strategy priorities it included “development of the rental housing sector”. 58 
for young and socially weak households and even formulate a target size for the formal 
rental sector of 18 percent of the housing stock by 2020 (up from about 10 percent in 
2003). The proposed measures focus on developing private rental housing through 
conversions from the existing stock, through consolidation of the municipal social rental 
stock (and expansions, mainly through existing stock acquisitions, enabling non-profit 
housing initiatives through new legislation), and through funding a nationwide housing 
allowance program that also covers private rental stock. Whether the strategy can truly 
fulfill the expectation of a more tenure-neutral policy remains to be seen. The same 
strategy has already introduced mortgage interest deductibility,
98 which could distort the 
tenure choice of households with higher ability-to-pay for homeownership. Also, owners 
remain strongly subsidized through below-cost municipal maintenance and capital repairs 
done to multifamily buildings, as well as through subsidized mortgage insurance and up-
front grants to first-time homebuyers. Such potential and actual distortions call for 
correction. 
  Poland has been pursuing the most pro-rental policy of the studied countries. This 
orientation has been consistent throughout transition, despite attempts to introduce 
mortgage market subsidies on a large scale and the long controversy about rent controls.
99 
Although Poland today has a mortgage interest deductibility system, within limits, it 
should avoid the excesses of mortgage subsidization that occurred in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. The social rental program has become diversified since 1997 through the 
non-profit TBS system, and some expect a breakthrough for the private rental sector from 
recent court rulings on rent control. Inconsistencies remain, however: a legal reform 
agenda remains, particularly for eviction; there is a fair amount of policy stop-and-go, 
particularly on budgets; and the housing policy program as a whole is still insufficiently 
targeted to the poorest households. (The housing allowance system is insufficient, TBS 
targets the middle class, there is no public housing for evicted tenants, public housing 
volumes are low, and there are rural infrastructure gaps.) 
  In Romania a national housing strategy has been formulated and adopted by the 
responsible ministry.
100 The priorities are: enhancing homeownership through mortgage 
lending, completing unfinished buildings, modernizing (upgrading) the apartment stock, 
and constructing rental units for low-income and young households. The legal reform 
program is focused on mortgage and capital market development. However, a rent reform 
program is under consideration and may soon require more active domestic debate and 
policy dialogue with international partners. Because ex post evaluation of housing 
programs is undeveloped, the cost-benefit evaluation of the current investment and 
subsidy programs is not available. The proposed depth of subsidies in individual program 
                                                 
98   Forced by the Ministry of Finance, which resisted calls for targeting and grading this implicit subsidy, claiming 
this was part of the plan to discourage young human capital from leaving the country. 
99   At the inception of housing reforms, the intention was to begin with radical rent reforms, to introduce much 
higher housing effort ratios supported by requisite social protection schemes. These efforts failed because of 
substantial political resistance.  
100   See Ministry of  Transport, Construction, and Tourism (2004). 59 
formulations seems high (20 percent of the value of owner-occupied dwellings, 50 
percent of the construction costs of social housing units), suggesting room for 
improvement in cost recovery and program reach.  
  The President’s Office in Russia has become increasingly active in supporting the 
development of the government’s reform initiatives in housing and housing finance, 
although larger cities, especially Moscow and Saint Petersburg, have been also pursuing 
independent local housing strategies. The end of 2004 brought a flurry of legislative 
initiatives, most of which were adopted by the Parliament. They focused primarily on 
promoting individual homeownership by lowering transactions costs and providing 
greater access to mortgage finance and included tax benefits. In the rental sector, a new 
housing code has been adopted to replace the legislation introduced when resources 
existed for the provision of free housing. The code focuses on specifying social and 
commercial (private) tenancies, defining conditions for rent setting and eviction, and 
establishing criteria for tenants’ eligibility for state aid. In this context, terminating the 
current privatization option after a transition phase of three years has been proposed. 
There are also intentions to introduce private rental and cooperative legislation. The 
budget implications of these tenure policies remain unclear and will likely be determined 
mainly at the local level. As tax impediments to mortgage finance are cleared, no similar 
initiative has appeared for the rental sector, where tax authorities have stepped up 
enforcement and discouraged landlords from formalizing their contracts. In social 
housing, similarly, resources do not match ambitions: the proposal to allow local 
governments to retain the full proceeds from urban land sales might lead to greater 
flexibility in funding local housing construction efforts.  
  Serbia, with assistance from the World Bank and the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, has started formulating policy for a comprehensive national housing strategy. 
The strategy will likely focus on the full integration of refugees into the housing 
economy, land reform, and improvement in management of the existing housing stock, 
including condominium creation and public rent reform. Budgetary resources focus on 
reestablishing the government’s ability to invest in housing sector infrastructure and 
funding urgent housing stock repair and maintenance. Both public and private investment 
in the sector is severely constrained by the low ability-to-pay of households. 60 
5.  STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions  
Regional Tenure Choice 
Rental Housing Supply 
Only a small supply of social rental housing “survived” the privatization waves of the 1990s. The 
rental sector in the region as a whole, including private and non-profit rental housing, is much 
smaller relatively than in developed market economies with similar patterns of demographics, 
urbanization, mobility needs, and building inventory. This is especially so in Armenia, Serbia, 
and Romania, where the formal rental sector is a barely traceable residual. In Russia the rental 
sector is significant, but only because it consists primarily of social rental housing slated for 
eventual privatization. In Lithuania social rental is decimated, but there is a lively, informal 
rental market in individual apartments. In Poland the significant rental sector is more diversified 
and includes the restituted prewar rental buildings, and the cooperative rental apartment stock 
(Figure 11).  
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Source: Households surveys (Table 1), national statistical offices.  
Note: Czech Republic and Slovakia: all units in housing cooperatives counted as non-owner-occupied because of 
lack of detailed data on renting.  
With the notable exception of Poland, the apartment sector in the studied countries is 
characterized by the lack of clear ownership titles to common property of M-F buildings and 61 
surrounding grounds. This can be described as a sort of shadow public rental sector despite the 
legal privatization of individual apartments. It indicates that the mass privatization policy 
produced high, unintended inefficiencies, by failing to produce homeowners willing and able to 
undertake necessary maintenance and capital repairs of common property in the M-F buildings 
that still dominate the post-Soviet urban areas.  
Considering the conceptual and practical difficulties of implementing efficient common-property 
management systems in M-F building - difficulties not limited to the transition countries - the 
question arises whether the close correlations in mature market economies are not in fact a 
market rather than a policy outcome. The subsequent question is whether the observed deviations 
in transition countries can be called policy failures.  
Rental Housing Demand and Rent Levels 
The analysis of the household survey dataset suggests that tenure patterns in the region follow 
broadly those observed in mature economies for age structure and incomes. However, the 
markets seem far too small to accommodate young and mobile households in quantitative terms. 
Conditions for young migrants in Romania and Russia seem most severe.
101 This allows for the 
conclusion that low availability of urban rental housing reduces labor market adjustment at least 
in some transition countries.  
As far as income is concerned, demand patterns in transition countries are skewed by the fact 
that young and mobile households, which show particularly high demand for rental tenure, are 
among the economic winners of transition. Hence the finding of both low- and high-income 
households in the private rental sector in some studied countries.  
Standard predictions of filtering theories, which suggest low willingness of social stock tenants 
to move as incomes rise, are partly confirmed by the empirical findings. This result holds for 
both Poland and Russia; in the marginalized public rental systems of the remaining countries, 
higher-income households have privatized their units. Filtering in the remaining public sector 
stock in the region is often promoted by the particular incentive structure imposed by 
“slumification,” which leads to an adjustment of building quality downward to rent levels. 
There is evidence that the current swift expansion of the mortgage market reduces the natural 
growth prospects of the rental markets, as high-income tenants are pulled toward greenfield 
investment or higher-quality stock purchases. The effect varies with local financial and land and 
housing market conditions. It will likely put pressure on current rent levels and lead to faster 
filtering down of rental housing units. Given that the households with high ability-to-pay are 
leaving, minimum quality standards are moving to the fore of policy issues. 
In the residual social rental sector, where prices do not adequately signal scarcity, typical target 
groups are no longer served. In all studied countries this affects the young and mobile, who have 
to rely overwhelmingly on the private rental sector or forms of homeownership to satisfy their 
                                                 
101  Although difficult to prove, anecdotal evidence suggests that the current considerable outmigration of young 
talent to the West is partly caused by the inability of these households to secure “decent” starter housing. 62 
housing demand. Public hostel or rental programs for the young have been set up in several 
countries but seem rather insignificant. Furthermore, the “residualization” of the social rental 
sector is mirrored by the marginalization of its tenants in terms of income and age profile in all 
countries. The exceptions are Poland - which continues to have an active public housing policy - 
and Russia, with its large and yet undefined social rental stock.
102  
Although only equilibrium values of tenure patterns and rent levels can be observed, the 
conclusion from the quantity-price relations observed in the studied countries is that rental 
housing demand in transition economies is rather strong. The housing expenditure and rent data 
suggest that, with the exception of Poland (which has residues of rent control), private rental 
housing costs are high relative both to values typically obtained in transition countries, and to 
public rental or owner-occupied housing expenditures. However, they are moderate compared 
with the rental burden in Western economies. 
In terms of the efficiency of matching demand and supply through market mechanisms -
including non-institutionalized and informal ones - the studied countries may be divided into 
three broad groups:  
  The most advanced transition (and EU accession) countries (Lithuania and Poland) 
experience high demand pressure for renting, with supply being somewhat responsive, 
mitigating the upward pressure on rents.  
  The mid-advanced transition countries (Romania and Russia) experience high demand 
pressure for rental apartments, which coincides with a pronounced scarcity of supply. 
  The least advanced post-conflict countries (Armenia and Serbia) experience relatively 
subdued demand for housing in general, including rental housing.  
These groups correspond to countries’ progress along the general reform path. 
Regional Tenure Policies 
Legal, Regulatory, and Tax Reform 
Progress in legal and regulatory reform of the rental housing sector in the region has been 
painfully slow, with strong political resistance by numerous privatized tenant-owners and social 
housing tenants. These tenants dominate the political arena, given that they continue to enjoy 
high subsidies (explicit and implicit). Consequently, most regulations and subsidies deal with 
social housing, while private landlord-tenant relationships remain mainly unregulated.  
It is perhaps over-stretched to cite eastern Germany’s experience, where between 1990 and 1996 
a complete set of rent and tax regulations was implemented and rents in the public stock rose 
fivefold to reach levels almost as high as those in western Germany (with socially weak tenants 
supported by housing allowances). However, the valid core factor may be that political resistance 
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to legal and tax reform in eastern Germany was weak because the median voter was a West 
German single-family homeowner with little concern for the short-term interests of eastern 
German apartment tenants. The studied countries have a different political economy altogether, 
but this should not serve as an excuse for not tackling the remaining and necessary fundamental 
sector reforms.  
It is difficult to distinguish the all-round best practice case among the studied countries. In terms 
of legal reforms, Lithuania’s civil code is the most comprehensive effort; however, because 
default tenancy is permanent, it is potentially the most restrictive from the landlord perspective.  
The Russian legislation, especially the new housing code, can be expected to raise the current 
standard, if properly enforced. Tenancies are limited to five years, which helps circumventing a 
number of problems with regard to rent adjustment and termination. Poland recently made a bold 
move to liberalize rents in both the public and private sectors, while providing safety nets 
through an expanded housing allowance program. Legislation in Romania suffers from the 
restitution dilemma, to which legislation and the court system reacted very restrictively, 
especially through rent controls and eviction barriers. Comprehensive legal reform ending the 
lack of clarity over issues such as rent control and establishing standard terms is advisable. 
Armenia and Serbia both stand at the beginning of a legal reform program that also should 
encompass general civil code reform.  
Rent control, or rent determination, deserves special attention. Progress in the private sector 
seems reasonable; however, conflicts are emerging for longer and permanent tenancies over the 
rate of rent increases upon reviews. Poland moved early in the right direction, linking rents to 
replacement cost levels and combining them with rent allowances, but has since suffered 
setbacks through court and parliamentary interventions. Rent determination in the public sector 
throughout the region is still inconsistent with cost recovery principles, especially considering 
the large modernization needs. All legislation, most notably the highly restrictive Romanian 
legislation, maximizes the subsidies required per unit and household and therefore lead to a 
highly inefficient public rental housing system. 
Beyond tenant-landlord and rent legislation, none of the studied countries has created an efficient 
dispute resolution and eviction execution system. Poland has the most experience in that regard, 
and the government’s plan to support temporary municipal shelters in order to tear down the 
eviction blockade is laudable. Still, the court system causes tight bottlenecks. None of the other 
countries has a dispute resolution system to speak of, apart from sporadic local solutions.
103  
Significant tax reforms are needed to provide reasonable conditions for private rental investors. 
Only in Poland can landlords deduct costs from rent revenues before being taxed and have 
incentives for modernization been created. The gross rent tax systems of Lithuania, Romania, 
and Russia, in contrast, provide disincentives to rental investments. In Lithuania this problem is 
somewhat limited because of low tax rates and options for evasion. Developing the private rental 
sector requires a change in current tax policy designs for small and corporate landlords: the 
benefit will be diversified investor categories and higher activity, including new rental housing 
construction. 
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Social Housing Reforms 
The new social rental programs that characterize four of the six studied countries suffer from 
deep subsidies and insufficient evaluation of costs and benefits, subsidy dependency, and 
targeting. Most public rental programs are too small and deeply subsidized to launch a 
significant attack on the problems they intend to address. The Polish TBS system seems to strike 
a compromise by successfully attracting private equity cofinancing and bank finance; however, a 
closer look will likely reveal deep subsidy dependency and an intended middle-class target 
group. A follow-up examination is recommended for this program, within a larger study of the 
need and form of PPP non-profit rental housing in ECA countries. 
Given the low resources at hand, Polish, Romanian, and Russian local governments -
independently from central governments - have adopted flexible approaches by buying new 
social units at the liquid secondary market. This strategy leads to lower housing standards for 
social tenants than under the socialist housing system, but it maximizes program reach and puts 
some downward pressure on private rents for the relevant target groups. Support for 
modernization investments and a tax system conducive to them could lead to similar efficiency 
gains, especially in the cooperative and private rental sector constituted mostly of old buildings. 
Programs that contain subsidies should be linked to targeting requirements, rent ceilings, and 
allocation rights for local governments.  
Experience with housing allowances for poor tenants and owners - the favorite brainchild of the 
early transition years - has been mixed, especially due to often inappropriate administration, 
frequent program changes, and insufficient budget support. Better funded allowance programs 
could still fulfill useful purposes if they supported a faster adjustment of rents and housing costs 
to cost recovery level after investment. This has not been the case so far, leading to expensive 
dual subsidies (allowances and investment cost subsidies). 
Future Research Needs 
Empirical Research 
Rental housing sector research has not been particularly strong in mature market economies 
outside the limited circle of countries with high rental sector shares and proactive rental policies 
(mainly Scandinavia, the Benelux, France, Britain, and Germany). Moreover, during the 1980s 
the rental sector was pushed ideologically onto the defensive and thus attracted less scholarly 
attention. Not surprisingly, the first wave of housing sector analysis for transition countries 
focused on homeownership and mortgage markets.  
A second shortcoming lies in detailed monitoring of the housing market by governments and 
independent analysts. Most census specifications do not provide information about tenure forms 
and are hard for researchers to access. Surveys are rare, and microcensus analysis that would, for 
instance, track household moving chains is absent. 
Improving the data support, which can sometimes be done simply by adding or reformulating 
questions in surveys or censuses, should be a first priority for governments interested in 
enhancing their rental sector policies. Follow-up studies are recommended with existing census 
and LSMS/HBS material, to differentiate the structure of demand and supply further. This could 65 
give valuable indications as to problem segments (such as high rent or housing cost ratios) that 
could be addressed by public policies (such as rent allowances), or the impact of certain policy 
measures (such as removal of rent controls). 
In-depth country-by-country rental sector analysis is advisable for all studied countries. The 
minimum empirical program should include stock and flow modeling, as well as pricing analyses 
along the lines presented in this chapter, with more detail on specific hypotheses. If household 
survey data are insufficiently detailed or incomplete, additional surveys in selected urban areas 
should be conducted. Supply factors such as investor types, regulations, and tax treatment should 
be addressed, too (see Chapter 4). A survey design template for such studies appears in Annex 2. 
The costs of such empirical efforts can be easily justified by the social and private benefits that 
policy action in favor of a broader and better functioning rental sector would bring. It is 
particularly advisable for countries experiencing significant private rental sector shortages 
(Russia and Romania in the study), or facing controversial policy choices, such as the transition 
from rent control to a market-based system (Poland). Worth further exploration are the 
interactions between the rental sector and labor market mobility, also in light of the developing 
spatial economics literature. A better calibration of labor market effects might help governments 
determine the right focus and scale of rental sector policies. 
Tenure Policy Research 
There are two relevant areas of future research in tenure policy: (i) detailed analysis of national 
rental housing policy frameworks; and (ii) cross-country policy studies deepening the 
understanding of actual practice. 
Annex 2 contains a rental housing study template that combines elements of both empirical and 
policy analysis. In the policy section, it broadly follows the outline of this chapter. Such a 
template should be applied systematically in transition countries both to inform domestic policy 
debates and design, and to facilitate international comparison and exchange, including policy 
dialogue with the Bank. 
There is also a need for better understanding of the impact and constraints faced by specific 
policy measures and comprehensive programs. For example, while there is relatively broad 
evidence of the distortions caused by hard rent controls, there is little knowledge about best 
practices for engineering the adjustment from rent control to market mechanisms. Also, 
alternatives to hard rent ceilings - such as market transparency concepts underlying soft rent 
controls - better suited to investor-tenant compromise are under-researched. Analogies from the 
mortgage sector, where usury and adjustment regulations exist in numerous forms, could broaden 
the feasible policy menu. Similar arguments can be made about alternative taxation models and 
regulatory incentives or impediments. 
Similarly important is the role of the public sector as a rental housing investor, a role that could 
play an important part in a poverty alleviation strategy, but which has come under “ideological 
siege” in the past 20 years. Partly as a result of political bias, research into new public 
investment strategies such as PPP and non-profit rental has subsided.  66 
Specifically, in the transition countries, the question of reconstituting a social rental sector is 
both urgent and politically highly relevant, given the intensifying calls for action from policy 
makers. New policy strategies in this area should be supported by more in-depth analysis of the 
successes and failures of the massive privatization strategy of the 1990s.  
Finally, inter- and intra-governmental institutional architecture issues should be studied to bring 
more understanding of the places where housing policy is explicitly or implicitly formulated and 
implemented.  
Recommendations for ECA Housing Policy Realignment 
 
Policy Directions 
There is a strongly growing need to address the unintended consequences of the mass 
privatization policies of the 1990s. Countries should formulate explicit rental housing policies 
and implement requisite programs as part of the post-privatization realignment of their housing 
policies. Rental choice policies should be seen as vital complements to homeownership policies, 
not as residual and temporary measures. Countries should consider basing their rental housing 
policies on the principle of relying mainly on the efficient private formalized rental sector, 
supplemented by well-targeted social rental housing programs. Private resources can be 
mobilized into the rental sector through programs aimed at developing the private, PPP, and non-
profit sectors.  
The range of options for achieving these objectives include searching for ways to bring certain 
privatized apartments back into the social rental sector or under private landlord investors. For at 
least some of the apartment stock, where capital depreciation has not proceeded too far, a 
reversal of the early privatization policies could enhance efficiency. No historical precedent 
supports the view that a public rental sector can be both successfully and completely converted 
into an owner-occupied condominium sector.
104 Rental landlords, whether social or private, can 
be perceived as more capable - and thus more likely - to mobilize necessary resources for capital 
repairs and upgrading, compared with the sometimes extreme socioeconomic mix of privatized 
tenant-owners unable to agree on necessary management and maintenance of common property 
in M-F buildings and surrounding grounds.  
The national rental housing policy frameworks developed so far include some recognition that 
the reform of the urban apartment sector in transition countries is unfinished and that further 
progress cannot rely on individual apartment ownership alone.
105 Furthermore, their developers 
                                                 
104   Maclennan (2001) tells the sobering story of the comparatively limited British experiment made by the Thatcher 
government in the 1980s. British right-to-buy units were proportionally more affected by the mortgage default 
crisis in the early 1990s. 
105  Skyner (2004) describes the legal, tax, and bureaucratic hurdles that the creation of condominiums face in 
Russia. The complexities of condominiums have historically led to their low empirical relevance in Western 
economies as well, where the sector covers less than 5 to 10 percent of the apartment stock. See Figure 1 and the 
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are more aware than ever that without real rent reform, including regulations of landlord-tenant 
relations, there will be no successful completion of housing reforms. 
At least from a policy design perspective, the current policy frameworks of Lithuania, Poland, 
Russia, and Romania foresee a prominent role for the rental sector, although to varying degrees 
and with varying differentiation between public-private and formal-informal. Only Poland has 
given the private formal sector an explicit and consistent co-responsibility in rental sector 
development - as co-financers of non-profit rental housing and as owners in a large private rental 
housing sector. Also, except in Poland, alternative management and ownership structures for M-
F apartment buildings other than condominiums (such as member-owned housing cooperatives 
or private institutional investors) play no significant role. Moreover, subsidized mortgage market 
programs and the decline in interest rates may “cannibalize” the rental sector by distracting high-
income households to the greenfield single-family residential developments exacerbating urban 
sprawl’s negative externalities. The likely outcome of reliance on existing investor categories 
and current market trends will be a renewed thrust toward new public housing and costly public 
housing modernization programs.  
Consequently, countries should consider anchoring their rental housing policies on the principle 
of relying mainly on the efficient private formalized rental sector, supplemented by social rental 
housing. Reliance on the private rental sector will require liberalizing rent determination; 
developing sufficiently clear landlord-tenant regulations, including dispute resolution and 
eviction procedures; securing sufficient competition to prevent usurious rent seeking; further 
developing nascent housing allowance systems; and establishing tax regulations that assure 
tenure-neutral treatment of investors.  
Some countries are signaling the need to develop non-profit rental housing to address 
affordability problems of middle-income and lower-middle-income households, those too poor to 
afford homeownership and too rich to quality for social housing or housing allowances. Only 
Poland has a government program in this area, but its outcome should be studied in depth for 
negative lessons and remedial recommendations. 
Implementation - Insufficient Budgets 
Whatever the formulated policy, public housing policy budgets in the region are far too small to 
launch a serious attack on the problems of the apartment sector within any given policy design. 
Consider that current formal housing policy budgets in the region are generally less than 1 
percent of GDP, compared with the postwar spending of 5 percent of GDP and the current 
spending by Western European countries of 1–3 percent of GDP. These figures rise after 
recognizing indirect and implicit subsidies but are still below the practice in mature market 
economies. 
Two significant causes can be identified: (i) continued push for fiscal austerity - partly caused by 
the desire for tax competition with mature economies and by related ambiguous international 
advice; and (ii) inefficient fragmentation of existing budgets, especially through parallel 
subsidization of housing programs and operation and modernization costs. This constellation will 
likely continue to preempt serious implementation success, except for isolated cases. Reducing 68 
fragmentation, especially by consolidating cost subsidies into the explicit housing budgets, 
should mobilize significant synergies. 
There are two meaningful directions for enhanced public expenditures: (i) encourage larger 
private sector involvement in private or non-profit rental; and (ii) create a small, but sustainable, 
and hence manageable, social housing sector.  
Implementation—Institutional Gaps 
With the exception of Poland, and to a lesser degree Lithuania and Romania, the studied 
countries still have inappropriate housing policy institutions. Local governments are still too 
weak, both financially and institutionally, to manage housing policy. Properly managed and 
instructed finance agencies are needed to organize resource transfers from the central 
government, and the capital markets, to local governments and other investors in the rental 
sector. Private investor groups need stronger economic incentives to participate in the rental 
sector, and better political support.  
Finally, housing policy needs regular monitoring, evaluation, and review. The current political 
structures are often not conducive of independent reviews that question the efficiency and 
success (goal attainment) of policies, although such structures do exist and are indirectly 
influential (Poland, Russia). In general too little budget is reserved for communication with the 
public, data generation and management, and analytical and comparative work. This deficit 
raises the risk of costly misallocation of scarce public resources. ANNEX 1 
KNOWLEDGE BASE ON HOUSING TENURE CHOICE 
Housing policy programs in the ECA transition countries have often been designed by line 
ministries in response to political expediencies and special interest lobbying pressures. The 
general lack of comprehensive housing strategies can be ascribed partly to the lack of a sector 
wide knowledge base available to the fledgling policy expert communities. Consequently, this 
annex starts compiling the knowledge base requested by these experts as a measure of domestic 
capacity building. 
A) Theoretical Analyses 
Housing Market Theory 
Over the past forty years, the topic of housing markets has generated a significant body of 
literature. Numerous studies have focused on issues related to housing demand, housing tenure, 
and housing market behavior. Building on the lines of thought of neoclassical theory, ample 
empirical evidence suggests that housing as an economic good responds to market forces in a 
manner similar to that of other commodities. Yet, housing does not deliver only one good as it 
features a wide array of characteristics, including durability, spatial fixity, and heterogeneity. 
Moreover, there is extensive involvement of government with the argument of housing as a basic 
need for all households. Therefore, there are reasons to argue that it is impossible to analyze 
housing decisions within the framework of the neoclassical theory of supply and demand without 
modification.  
The Standard Model 
The standard neoclassical model of housing demand advances several theoretical arguments 
about consumer behavior, the nature of the housing commodity, and the housing market. It looks 
on housing consumption decision making as a part of broader utility-maximizing consumer 
decision making (see below). In doing so, the heterogeneity issue is disregarded by assuming the 
existence of demand for an unobservable homogenous commodity called housing services (Muth 
1960; Olsen 1969). However, the standard model already examines the durability character of 
housing by treating housing as a homogeneous capital stock that yields one unit of housing 
services per unit of time as quasi-dividends. Other assumptions include perfect capital markets, a 
tax-free environment, and asset markets in equilibrium (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980).  
The neoclassical theory postulates that households maximize their utility with respect to different 
goods and services, including housing services, subject to a budget constraint where expenditures 
for housing are part of the total expenditures. In this setting the general form of the housing 
demand equation can be expressed in the following form: 
) , , , ( T P P Y q Q o h = , where Q is housing consumption, Y is household income,  h P is the relative 
price of housing, o P is a vector of prices of other goods and services, and T is a vector of taste 
factors.  
The Standard Model can answer general questions regarding the relationship between income 
and price for housing services or building materials and housing output as well as the impact of 
preferences on housing demand.  Annex 1 
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The Inter-temporal Dimension 
The  first  departure from the standard model adds the inter-temporal dimension, i.e., the 
empirical fact that short-term housing consumption (demand) depends on long-term housing 
investment decisions. The linkage is provoked by the imbalance between typically large initial 
investment costs (‘lumpiness’) vs. the low initial depreciation rates and other consumption utility 
flows derived from the housing stock. The result is a mismatch of the excess of utility over costs 
in the flow perspective – initially negative, then turning positive - that requires some sort of 
inter-temporal financing. And vice versa, because of these stock-flow characteristics housing is 
popular as a storage of wealth and a long-term asset in the retirement portfolio of households.  
The analysis of housing decisions with an inter-temporal modeling framework was historically 
developed jointly with the literature on life-cycle decision making (Blinder 1974, Beach et al. 
1981). In the typical setting households maximize their lifetime utility subject to multi-period 
budget constraints. The formulation of lifetime budget constraints requires further specification 
of assumptions about the flows of incomes, prices, interest rates, depreciation rates, and the 
conditions of financial markets. The main impact of the inter-temporal modeling framework on 
the Standard Model has been to introduce different housing supply curves – short and long-term 
– whose relative slopes depend on the above assumptions and which are linked through an 
investment function.  
Capturing Heterogeneity 
The second departure of the Standard Model considers the heterogeneity of housing in terms of 
delivering goods to households. Two approaches can be distinguished. The first approach 
suggests that households value only individual goods derived from housing for their individual 
characteristics (Becker 1965; Lancaster 1966). The second approach is based on the assumption 
that housing is a bundled commodity possessing both a quantity and a quality dimension. The so-
called characteristics framework introduced by Rosen (1974) combines both approaches and has 
been widely applied in housing research. It allowed analysts to study a housing unit as a vector 
of tangible characteristics. The pricing of the housing unit depends on the presence or absence of 
these characteristics. As Smith et al. (1988, p. 37) point out, “Various bundles and their 
associated prices reveal the implicit prices of characteristics, known as hedonic prices.” The 
main advantage of this approach is that empirically hedonic prices can be determined which may 
be used to estimate demand functions for individual housing characteristics (Quigley 1979). 
Over the past decades, the characteristics framework has arguably produced more realistic 
hypotheses than those obtained by relying on the Standard Model featuring only one 
homogeneous good. 
Spatial Fixity 
The most recent strand of housing market theory that has only fully developed in the past two 
decades generates a more refined view of the spatial fixity of housing, and thus important 
departures from neoclassical theory. Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) present this 
dynamically developing body of research in the general context of spatial economics. The 
general line is to see location as the single economically dominating element of the 
characteristics set of housing and as a consequence of the singularity of location to regard the 
perfect competition assumption between housing units being in different locations as unrealistic. 
Rather, in the mainstream of the new literature the production function for goods or services 
derived from housing units is typically characterized by increasing returns of scale at the regional Annex 1 
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(inter-agglomeration) level and monopolistic competition at the urban (intra-agglomeration) 
level. Analysis of transport costs, which has been the nucleus of this type of research developed 
already in the 19
th century, and other spatial factors add to the understanding of the competition 
structures within the urban housing stock and between urban and suburban housing stock. 
Tenure Choice Theory 
The strand of housing theory literature of specific interest for the present study explores the 
determinants of household housing tenure choice and the optimal share of renting vs. owning in 
society as a whole.  
Again, the starting point is the neoclassical theory that assumes the rationality of economic 
agents and their ability to choose different types of tenure in order to maximize utility subject to 
a budget constraint (Arnott 1987). However, with homeownership both consumption and 
investment decision now fall together and need to be taken simultaneously by the same 
household. Obviously not all households are able or willing to do so. Building on the observation 
of household heterogeneity, both economic and socioeconomic approaches have been developed 
to account for differences in tenure choice.  
In the economic approach, household income and wealth as well as exogenous factors such as 
taxes and relative prices are considered as the main determinants of the tenure decision 
(Henderson and Ioannides 1989; Plaut 1987). There is a broad consensus among researchers that 
the propensity to become a homeowner increases with household income and wealth. The 
economic approach also postulates that changes in relative prices such as mortgage rates, tax 
levels and inflation rate influence tenure choice. Relative prices can be captured in user costs of 
capital approach summarizing the costs of homeownership and the costs of renting. In addition, 
transactions costs of becoming a homeowner (e.g., stamp duties, notary costs) and access to 
finance play a significant role – but these factors have mostly emerged from empirical research 
(see below). 
In contrast, the socioeconomic approach argues that tenure choice involves a deeper interplay of 
socioeconomic characteristics of households and supply-demand conditions in the housing 
market (Clark and Dieleman 1996). For example Deurloo et al. (1987) claim that tenure choice is 
affected by demographic factors through changing socioeconomic status rather than through the 
life cycle alone. Age, family size, and family composition are significant factors affecting tenure 
choice (Deurloo et al. 1987) and households are likely to change their tenure choice toward 
homeownership when they become older or start a family.  
The subsequent section discusses selected empirical research that has been undertaken with 
regard to the discussed theories. 
B) Empirical Analyses 
Arguably, the empirical work on the determinants of housing demand and tenure choice has at 
times been more advanced than the theoretical one, due to the prevalence of political and 
practical over academic interest in the sector. In developed markets, many policy institutions, 
such as financing agencies or housing ministries, sponsor regularly empirical housing research. 
According to Rothenberg et al. (1991), empirical housing research can be grouped into four 
categories: demand for housing services, demand for individual housing attributes, neighborhood 
choice analysis, and tenure choice studies.  Annex 1 
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Demand for Housing Services 
The bulk of empirical research has been undertaken in order to estimate the effects of income 
and price elasticities on demand for housing services. In these studies, housing services are 
typically modeled as a continuum quantity and considered as a function of the price of housing, 
non-housing expenditures, and other socioeconomic variables.  
Being held as the first author to have estimated the income elasticity of housing demand, 
Houthakker (1951) set the agenda for subsequent analyses in the field. However, despite 
numerous empirical studies, the magnitude of income elasticity of housing is still widely debated 
in academic literature.  
One camp of economists contends that housing demand is generally very elastic with regard to 
income (DeLeeuw and Ekanem 1971). According to Arcelus and Meltzer’s (1973) estimations, 
the income elasticity of housing demand for the U.S. is 0.94. Arcelus and Meltzer suggested that 
the demand for housing services depends on the real value of financial assets. Using Lorenz 
concentration curves, a more recent study by Hansen et al. (1996) demonstrated that income 
elasticity is somewhat less than unity for all income levels.  
Challenging the results of high income elasticity, other studies have estimated the income 
elasticity of housing demand as low as 0.1 (Kain and Quigley 1975). Mayo (1981) also 
concluded that the demand for housing is rather income-inelastic, with parameter values ranging 
from 0.25 to 0.70 for renters and from 0.36 to 0.87 for owners. The findings from Goodman and 
Kawai’s (1984) study lent further support to Mayo’s. 
Several studies extended this research by exploring the correlation between income and the 
income elasticity of housing demand. Ihlanfeldt (1982), for example, showed that the income 
elasticity of housing demand tends to rise with the income level. He found that the income 
elasticity for low-income households falls between 0.14 and 0.62, whereas in the case of high-
income households it lies between 0.72 and 1.1. Using time-series data, a study undertaken by 
Mayo and Sheppard (1996) estimated that the income elasticity ranges from 0.5 to unity across 
income levels. Most studies found support for the argument that the income elasticity of owners 
is moderately higher than the one of renters. Only a few empirical investigations have produced 
evidence that income elasticities exceed unity. 
Demand for Individual Housing Attributes and Neighborhood Choice 
Another body of literature puts the demand for individual housing characteristics at the center of 
its analysis. Such characteristics as location, number of bedrooms, and number of floors have 
been analyzed. In this line of research, authors have looked into the provision of public goods as 
an additional factor affecting housing demand.  
Building on McFadden’s (1978) seminal paper, a strand of the empirical literature focuses on 
neighborhood choice. Ioannides and Zabel (2003) showed empirically that individuals prefer to 
have neighbors with similar socio-economic characteristics. They estimated that the elasticity of 
housing demand with respect to the mean of the neighbor’s housing demands ranges from 0.19 to 
as high as 0.65.  Annex 1 
73 
Tenure Choice  
The determinants of tenure choice have been widely empirically researched in a number of 
directions. 
Permanent income, relative prices, taxation.  
Early studies on housing tenure choice have focused on the role of permanent income and 
relative prices, as measured by the user cost of capital in rental and owner-occupied housing, as 
determinants of tenure choice (Rosen and Rosen 1980; King 1980).  
More recent research added or deepened the analysis of the impact of taxation to the user costs, 
especially in the U.S. where mortgage interest deductibility has a long tradition (Titman 1982; 
Narwold 1992; Wood 2001).  
Access to finance 
A core aspect of tenure choice that has been widely researched is the barriers to access to 
homeownership imposed by financing constraints such as down-payment requirements. The 
available studies confirm the expected negative impact of such constraints on homeownership. 
(Jones 1989, 1995; Linneman and Wachter 1989; Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter 1997; 
Rosenthal 2002). The question of tenure choice and access-to-finance constraints of immigrants 
has been addressed in more recent studies (Coulson 1999).  
Employment status and income uncertainty 
Frogner (2002) investigated the effect of employment status on housing choice using U.K. data. 
She found that the employed are more likely to become homeowners than the unemployed. The 
study also found an independent impact of the number of breadwinners in a household on tenure 
choice. Approximately 70 percent of homeowners in the U.K. belong to a household in which at 
least one adult works. The share of homeowners reaches 84 percent if the household has two or 
more working adults.  Frogner attributed the regional differences in homeownership rates 
observed in the U.K. to relative strength of labor markets. In her sample, higher homeownership 
rates are correlated with lower unemployment rates.    
Diaz-Serrano (2004) investigates the effect of labor income uncertainty on the probability of 
homeownership in Germany and Spain, two countries with highly different rental housing shares. 
He observes for both cases, though, that households facing increasing income uncertainty display 
preference for renting, while those with lesser uncertainty show a greater propensity for 
homeownership.  
Age and income co-linearity 
Econometric analysis of tenure choice often suffers from co-linearity between age and income 
variables. Controlling for income in a European cross-country review with European household 
panel data, Barcelo (2003) finds empirical support for the life-cycle theory of tenure choice: 
younger individuals show a higher probability of living in rented houses. An important aspect of 
the life-cycle theory is access to finance, and here in particular the requirement of large down 
payments hinders home acquisition by young households. 
Interest rates 
Painter and Redfearn (2002) explore the role of interest rates in explaining homeownership and 
housing starts. The authors present evidence that in the short run, changes in interest rates or Annex 1 
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incomes have no effect on homeownership rates. In addition, even rather large swings in interest 
rates have insignificant long-run effects on homeownership rates, while changes in incomes and 
demographic variables cause considerable variations in homeownership rates over time.  
Rent controls 
Rent control is a strong candidate for impacting tenure choice because it directly affects the 
relative user costs of owning vs. renting. Rent controls are also held to interrupt the filtering up 
of higher-income households, which without benefiting from such protections would vacate 
lower-quality units for lower income households more quickly. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
empirical literature does not cover the impact of rent control on tenure choice and filtering in 
great depth. In an otherwise comprehensive overview paper Arnott (1998) makes some cursory 
reference. He points to some level of ambiguity as far as total homeownership demand is 
concerned as rent control may either decrease (for sitting tenants) or increase (for outsiders) 
demand. At the same time, he argues that controls unambiguously provide a clear incentive to 
convert rental units into condominiums, a move often met with legal restrictions.  
Transactions costs 
Tenure choice is also clearly affected by transaction costs for the acquisition of housing. In 
Europe and the United States typical acquisition costs for houses or apartments are between 5 
and 10 percent of the price and thus considerably above transaction cost levels for rental units. 
Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies (2004) finds in that regard that two-thirds of U.S. 
owners who move choose to become renters initially, most likely because of transaction costs. 
This is consistent with older findings of Weinberg, Friedman and Mayo (1981), in which with 
U.S. household survey data they showed an disproportional increase in the likelihood of moving 
of renters in response to the desired change in housing consumption, hinting at the relevance of 
transaction costs. 
Cultural Factors  
The changing make-up of the American society has stimulated scholarly interest in the analysis 
of the relationship between race, immigration and tenure choice. By examining the tenure 
choices of African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and whites, Coulson (1999) found evidence 
for the effects of income, market prices, demographics, and immigration status on differentials of 
homeownership rates. He documented however that difference in incomes dominated in 
explaining the black-white and Hispanic-white differences in homeownership. Coulson further 
found that immigrants had substantially lower rates of homeownership. In addition, Painter et al. 
(2001) shows that the differences in homeownership rates among Asian, Latino, and white 
households can be explained by income differentials, immigrant status, and household mobility. 
However, these factors in his findings fail to explain large parts of the differences in 
homeownership rates between African-American and white households.   
Multifactor Studies 
The empirical analysis conducted by Gyourko and Linneman (1997) exemplifies empirical 
studies that examine a combination of demographic and economic factors in relation to tenure 
choice over time. Gyourko and Linneman argue that the speed of convergence in homeownership 
rates between the most educated and least educated households has significantly decelerated in 
recent decades in the United States. Furthermore, their empirical estimation results demonstrated 
that such traditional demographic factors of ownership rates as marital status and the presence of Annex 1 
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young children in the home no longer exercise a strong effect on tenure choice, whereas the 
predictive power of education and income (wealth) has increased in accounting for 
homeownership patterns. Finally, the study documented evidence that homeownership rates 
substantially increased among the youngest adult households during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Cross-Country Studies  
Since homeownership rates greatly vary from country to country, several recent studies tackled 
the issue of housing tenure choice with cross-country comparisons. Using data on 14 OECD 
countries, Chiuri and Jappelli (2000) demonstrated that financing constraints, such as the level of 
down payment required for obtaining housing finance, are an important determinant of 
homeownership, particularly for the young. The estimated coefficients indicated that increasing 
the down-payment ratio by 10 percentage points reduces homeownership by 1.6 points. They 
also found that demographic variables, both household size and education, are positively 
correlated with homeownership rates. Based on their estimation results, Chiuri and Jappelli 
concluded that convergence in European mortgage markets will increase demand for housing and 
mortgages.   
Linkages between Tenure Choice and Labor Mobility 
An important strand of the tenure choice literature studies the implications of tenure choice for 
the labor market. The recent study by Barcelo (2003) quoted before also empirically examined 
the relationship between housing tenure choice and labor mobility in five European countries 
using the European Community Household Panel Survey. Barcelo finds homeowners to be more 
reluctant than renters to move to other areas to work. Another important finding is that owners 
and renters living in social housing respond to changes in the local labor market in a fashion 
similar to private renters. They differ, however, in their desires to migrate for job reasons from 
private renters. The study also suggests that the probability of changing residence for job reasons 
is higher if the homeowner has a larger outstanding mortgage.  
In analogy to the transaction costs argument for homeowners, Svarer, Rosholm, and Munch 
(2003) show with Danish data that households living in rent-controlled units are less likely to 
accept jobs outside their local labor market and are unemployed longer.  
C) Tenure Choice Policy Best Practice 
Intervention Rationales 
The Identification Problem - Market or Policy Failure?  
Rental housing policy interventions have historically been motivated through the persistence of 
extreme market signals, such as extremely high rents, high levels of crowding or vacancies, 
supply shortages, and resulting labor market imbalances. In economies where renters have strong 
political clout, such spells have resulted in high levels of policy intervention, with significant 
resources or regulatory verve. One-time policy interventions—such as the introduction of rent 
controls in Europe at the end of World War I—frequently became permanent features of the 
housing market. The fundamental questions to be addressed when designing a policy program 
are therefore whether extreme market signals are due to failure of markets or of policies, and 
what the cost-benefit relation of policies is. Annex 1 
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Types of Market Failure 
Various types of market failures can be responsible for the presence of high prices in the rental 
sector. We discuss two key types of failure: imperfect market structure and information 
asymmetry. 
  The rental market has been a textbook case for less than perfect market structure, 
producing monopolies or monopolistic competition situations with resulting pricing 
powers on the side of landlords.  
-  The slumlord is a typical example for monopolistic competition: in a market 
economy, every tenant in the slum has the option to move into a better 
neighborhood; however, this usually requires a large stepwise increase in 
affordability. Until this affordability level is reached, the slumlord can exploit the 
situation by charging excess rents or allowing housing service quality to 
deteriorate.  
-  Public housing policies address the problem by introducing minimum housing 
standards and regulating rents, or producing public rental units. However, ill-
designed policies may not cure and may even exacerbate market failure. The 
pricing power of landlords is more limited, the faster new rental units are supplied 
(through new construction or conversions of owner-occupied units). This speed is 
often slowed by minimum housing standards, which increase landlords’ pricing 
powers in the remaining - now informal - markets. 
  Landlords need remedies to overcome information asymmetry with respect to the tenant’s 
ability and willingness to pay, or inclination to maintain the apartment. Rents may become 
very high if such asymmetries persist; for example, because deposits are outlawed or eviction 
is costly or impossible. Similar asymmetry may exist on the side of the tenant, with respect to 
necessary repairs or maintenance. Public policies have addressed asymmetry issue through 
laws governing tenant-landlord relationships. The danger is that laws that protect tenants 
discourage rental housing supply too much and lead to an adverse selection of landlords, 
promoting slumlords. 
  Similar asymmetries and selection effects may arise on the funding side, because 
landlords require capital market funding with loanable funds for investment. Systems 
with under-funded rental landlords tend to be characterized by neglect and deferred 
maintenance. Funding rental landlords is risky business for lenders, though. Inadequate 
leverage and mismatch may lead to an increase in bankruptcy risk - landlords may hold 
variable-rate assets and be funded at fixed rates or vice versa. Ill-defined small business 
bankruptcy laws may make finance extremely costly. Some landlords may not have any 
access to finance. Public policies have responded to these problems by creating larger 
borrower entities, such as public housing companies or cooperatives, or facilitating 
landlord access to finance through public loan or guarantee programs.  
Types of Policy Failure 
Even a superficial look at the history of European and American housing policy in the twentieth 
century would suggest a high incidence of policy failure - that is, policies that caused rather than 
cured rental market shortages.  Annex 1 
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Particularly relevant are interventions that permanently altered the relative price relations and 
therefore massively intervened into investment and tenure decisions of the private sector. Several 
relative price relations are of interest: those between the main submarkets of the housing sector, 
which interact through the filtering chain, and those between the housing market and capital and 
labor markets.  
Tenure Neutrality and the Filtering Chain 
Apart from policy failures related to microeconomic problems discussed above, the most drastic 
housing policy failures have related to violation of the neutrality of household tenure decisions 
and the consequences for filtering process. 
Considering building technology as given, the relation between rents and mortgage rates is the 
central relative price of the housing sector. Rents subsume various factors of the housing market 
in one price: size, location, and quality. They also contain policy factors such as taxation and 
subsidies provided to landlords. Similarly, mortgage rates provide market information about the 
opportunity costs of resources spent for land acquisition and construction, risks on the capital 
market or individual credit risk, and policy factors such as public guarantees, taxes, and 
subsidies.  
The relation between both prices determines tenure choice and thus the relative size of rental and 
owner-occupied housing markets. Hence, policy distortions in any of the two prices may lead to 
distortions of tenure choice and relative market size.  
The pattern of migration of households through the housing stock over time is shown in Figure 
12. As household incomes rise, the income effect allows higher housing consumption, which 
typically requires changing the tenure form. This characterization is stylized, because the quality 
distributions of rental and owner-occupied units in reality overlap. 
Rent-free and subletting arrangements mark the start of a housing career, typically followed by 
some form of social housing (employee or student housing), then - with a job change or the first 
job after graduation - a private rental apartment, the first home with the start of a family, and 
finally perhaps a larger home. Each time the household vacates a unit, a better-quality unit is 
demanded - perhaps even a new one. Thus lower-quality (often older) units filter down the 
income scale.  
Interventions into the relative prices of rent and mortgage rates cause problems for the filtering 
chain (Figure 12). Price interventions carry the risk of leading to excessive length of tenure in a 
specific stage of the housing career. This in turn leads to underuse of a given household’s ability 
and willingness to pay for improved housing: 
  Rental subsidies or rent controls may wean sitting tenants from the low costs of renting. 
As household income rises and the subsidy or control mechanism becomes mistargeted, 
the tenant will sit too long in rental tenure, lowering in turn the aggregate demand for 
owner-occupied housing. As a unit remains too long occupied and new rental supply is 
discouraged, households at lower income levels are confined to subletting or informal 
renting. If subsidies or price controls prevail, the only mechanism that gets the filtering 
chain back to work is to adjust the quality level to the rent level, by neglecting repair and 
maintenance. Annex 1 
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-  Rent subsidies have been typical in many European countries, particularly France, 
the Netherlands, Nordic countries, and Germany. All these markets have low 
owner-occupied housing sectors and low mobility of tenants and spend large 
proportions of their GDP on housing subsidies. 
 












Household income ~ age  
Source: Authors’ representation. 
 
-  Rent controls without supporting subsidies and with consequent deteriorating 
quality were characteristic of the British and Spanish private rental housing 
sectors until the 1970s and 1980s. In both markets, the share of the rental sector 
declined drastically over several decades.
106  
-  Deteriorating quality levels are also typical for many countries that have extreme 
public rental housing sector shares, particularly transition countries. The political 
economy of public rental often works against rents keeping pace with repair and 
maintenance costs.  
  Mortgage subsidies work toward the other extreme. They shorten rental sector tenure 
extremely and expand homeownership tenure beyond the economically sustainable 
period. Filtering down of lower quality units to rental is impaired and many rental units 
are converted and upgraded to owner-occupied status. The housing market becomes 
deeply segmented. 
-  The most extreme example is perhaps the United States, where a combination of 
de facto unlimited tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments and public and 
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private guarantee systems leads to extreme relative price distortions compared 
with renting.
107 When the current mortgage market setup was created in the 
1930s, rental housing was even excluded from loan guarantee schemes, a fact that 
has contributed to the urban decline that reached its culmination in the riots and 
high criminality levels of the 1960s and 1970s. 
-  The most damaging policies have been characterized by combinations of 
mortgage market subsidies and rent controls. Examples are the British housing 
market in the 1980s or the New York housing market. These situations usually 
lead to extreme levels of conversions and loss of rental housing stock. 
A rational policy will come close to an economic first-best situation, in which relative price 
relations between the relevant markets are not generally altered.
108 It will carefully analyze 




We focus here on interventions enabling or disabling the private rental sector. 
Regulation/Deregulation of Rents and Tenure 
Rationale  
Rent and tenure regulations may structure the tenant-landlord relationship in a way that 
minimizes the negative implications of information asymmetry. It may further address material 
protection issues, such as those arising from asymmetries of bargaining powers between landlord 
and tenant, from transactions costs (such as costs of moving) or imperfect market structure (such 
as monopolistic competition). However, ill-defined regulations historically created extreme 
policy lags and proved disastrous for the rental housing sector. 
Evidence 
Arnott (1998) provides a comprehensive literature overview focused on the impact of rent 
control. In historical perspective, rent controls can be differentiated between first and second 
generation. First generation controls, often the result of temporary policies during spells of high 
inflation or wartime housing shortages, aim at freezing rents and controlling their adjustment. 
Second generation rent controls introduce regulation governing conversion, maintenance, and 
tenant-landlord relations. Rent controls are found to lead to excess housing consumption by 
tenants, a recessive effect on the provision of rental housing and conversions into other uses, and 
wealth distribution effects between tenants and landlords. Concerning excess consumption, one 
of the earlier empirical studies by Olsen (1972) estimated that occupants of rent-controlled 
dwellings consumed 4.4 percent fewer housing services and 9.9 percent more non-housing goods 
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108  This argument was used in housing policy debates of the 1990s to promote lump-sum demand-side subsidies, 
which fulfill theoretical conditions of decision neutrality. We will return to this point in the instrument 
discussion.  
109  A good example of adherence to this principle was the German housing policy commission of 1995, headed by 
Hans-Werner Sinn. See Expertenkommission Wohnungspolitik (1995). Annex 1 
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than they would have consumed in the absence of rent controls. Early (2000) estimates the net 
benefits of rent control to tenants in New York City. His study concluded that, on average, 
tenants in rent-regulated units would have been better off if the regulations had never been 
introduced. Rent control acts all over the world, including India
110 and South Africa,
111 have 
been found to have similar effects. 
Dübel and Pfeiffer (1994) analyzed the situation in 11 European countries during the hot phase 
of rent deregulation. By the mid-1990s, a major re-thinking had taken place that had led to 
radical liberalization of rent legislation in those European countries whose private rental markets 
had suffered from controls dating back to World War I: Spain, Portugal, Britain, the Netherlands, 
and Denmark. New rental contracts became completely liberalized. Rent freezes or strict level 
controls were mostly abolished and replaced by cost rent (public sector) or comparative rent 
(private sector) systems.
112 To cushion the adjustment costs for tenants, rent increases for 
existing contracts arising from liberalization were capped or supported by rent allowances.
113 
Most countries also introduced some form of rollover of modernization costs on tenants. In 
addition, a certain convergence of tenure regulations took place. Britain started departing from 
the traditional Anglo-Saxon roll-over rental contract
114 and with the 1988 Housing Act 
introduced permanent (“assured”) tenancies. Germany, in turn, which had known only permanent 
tenancies, during a rental housing crisis in the late 1980s introduced short-term tenancies. 
Rent deregulation has widely been found to promote private rental sector development. In the 
United Kingdom, the sector expanded after the 1988 reform. Bailey, Findlay, and Gibb (1998) 
find that private rent changes were modest. Similarly, the Finnish rental housing sector 
experienced a rebound after the 1994 reforms. However, the speed of decontrol varied, 
depending on the degree of protection of sitting tenants: 
  In Italy, seven years after the 1992 rent reform, only an estimated 24 percent of tenancies 
were under the new law. Similar problems were recorded for Spain and Portugal 
(European Central Bank 2003).  
  In England, seven years after the 1988 deregulation, only 12 percent of private tenancies 
were not under the new law (Bailey, Findlay, and Gibb 1998). 
The European Central Bank in 2003 devoted large parts of its report on “Structural Factors in the 
EU Housing Markets” to the rental sector. For rent adjustment in existing contracts, it found that 
most EU countries have moved toward a system that allows some type of rent indexation to 
consumer price inflation or various freely negotiated adjustment clauses. Denmark and France 
use explicit indexation to housing costs, while Sweden has a collective bargaining mechanism. 
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levels and created a mediation system to enforce them. The German legislation moved toward inducing local 
governments to publish rental data raised with annual rent surveys (Mietspiegel), facilitating formal litigation.  
113  In some countries with newly reformed rent legislation (as in Spain) the highly regulated old rental contracts—
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While most countries have moved toward decontrolling rents in new contracts, this move has 
sometimes been limited to specific segments of the rental market, such as newly built houses (as 
in Denmark) or more expensive segments of the market, furthering regulatory segmentation of 
the rental market. Sweden seems to have the most restrictive mechanism in that regard, 
disallowing individual negotiation with prospective tenants.  
Conclusions 
There can be no doubt that excessively restrictive rent and tenure regulations have been a major 
cause of policy failure in rental housing markets. In particular hard rent control can be seen as a 
classical example of long and destructive policy lag. Liberalization of obsolete rent control 
systems has been found to stimulate the private rental sector. 
At the same time, we observe that markets with deep rental housing sectors have elaborate 
tenant-landlord regulations, which intervene in material issues of the contractual relationship. 
These issues should be assessed item by item: 
  Tenure security: While permanent contracts with limited options for termination by the 
landlord may have distortionary effects, these effects are lessened in systems that allow 
roll-over of investment costs and have liberal rent adjustment mechanisms. For an 
emerging market, shorter default tenure durations, perhaps five years, would be 
advisable to minimize risk. A pure roll-over system, with short contract durations and 
symmetric call options, carries the danger of high tenant turnover and adverse selection 
of tenants, as higher-income tenants seek tenure security as homeowners.  
  Rent control: The classic direct price control has been discontinued in developed 
markets. After decades of political fight, soft forms of usury control have proved their 
suitability in practice. For example, the comparative rent system allows relatively free 
rent setting within an empirically determined hedonic rent distribution (differentiated by 
quality and location factors). Usury is defined at relatively high mark-ups over average 
recorded rents. 
  Removal of rent subsidies: There is no easy political solution to adjusting artificially low 
rents of large numbers of sitting tenants, who are also voters. However, combining of 
such rent increases with temporary rent allowances for certain household groups has 
proven to be successful in eastern Germany and seems a promising avenue.  
Support for Private Rental Housing Investment 
Rationale  
Sufficient institutional structure, options to limit liability and deduct costs from taxable income, 
and access to funding are pivotal for investment conditions in the rental market. In many 
jurisdictions, small rental investors become discriminated against in favor of corporate investors 
in that regard.  
Evidence 
There is little conclusive analysis about the impact of institutional form on private rental 
investment. It seems clear, though, that reliance on corporate investors is insufficient to secure a Annex 1 
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broad and downward-penetrating formal rental market.
115 Likewise, a “cottage” private rental 
industry of small private landlords alone seems undesirable, because of its low investment 
generation capacity and lack of professionalism. Small private landlords also face difficulties in 
limiting personal liability and securing appropriate tax status, which frequently is limited to 
corporate investors. Crook and Kemp (2002) find that in the United Kingdom small private 
landlords received systematically lower investment returns than corporate investors.  
Dübel and Pfeiffer (1994) reviewed the European private rental sector for the EU Commission 
and found that unfavorable taxation treatment was partly responsible for the secular decline of 
the private rental sector, even in countries that did not practice or had abandoned rent control. 
Channels of distortions were the relative user costs of capital between renting and owning (see 
above), disallowance of cost deductions for small investors, and insufficient fit of tax support 
with the cash flow profile arising from a rental investment. It is instructive to compare three 
types of taxation approaches to small private landlords:   
  The United Kingdom applies a good investment concept to rental housing, in which 
expenditures are deducted from rental income when determining the income tax base. 
However, the tax advantage through offsetting losses in the initial years is insufficient to 
compensate for the cash flow shortfall of a leveraged investment, which will force 
landlords to reduce leverage and return and increase rents. In the United States, even the 
possibility of offsetting losses from rental income was curbed in the 1990s.  
  Ireland (in special business promotion schemes) and Germany (as a permanent policy), 
apply taxation concepts that subsidize the investment cash flow in the early years by 
creating fictive tax-deductible depreciation rates. Because cash flow gaps are lower, the 
leverage and profitability of the investment will be higher, or rents lower. At the same 
time, direct rent subsidies are avoided.  
  A third class of taxation systems, then applied in France and Spain, penalizes rental 
investment through gross rent taxes and other additional burdens on cash flows. 
Should a promotion concept follow the pure investment good concept or pursue a tax support 
strategy? The German experience suggests that although tax support leads to the intended 
reduction of the general rent level and a modern private rental housing sector, it has strong 
unintended consequences in the form of increases in urban land prices and rising barriers to 
homeownership. The pure investment good approach proved insufficient to stimulate the sector. 
The U.K. government therefore during the 1980s and 90s experimented with various schemes, 
including Business Expansion Schemes and Housing Investment Trusts for institutional 
investors, that had little success.
116 In contrast, Ireland appears successful in attracting new 
investor classes to the market with relatively deep tax support; however, support levels could not 
compensate for, and possibly contributed to, the house price and rent effects of a booming 
housing sector.  
The availability of finance has been a major impediment for the sector, particularly for small 
private landlords. Permanent tax support schemes have been used in Germany to comfort banks 
                                                 
115  Dübel and Pfeiffer (1996) found for South Africa that corporate rental housing investors had disappeared from 
the market within a few years because of announced legal changes and the perception of increased political risk. 
116   For a critique, see Maclennan (2001). Annex 1 
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about the creditworthiness of rental investment; however, experience in areas of market declines 
has demonstrated that permanent support may give rise to imprudent underwriting decisions. 
Nordic countries have used loan guarantee and interest support schemes for the private rental 
sector, often linked to some form of rent control or social targeting. At times, favorable market 
conditions have led to the emergence of rental housing finance as a product: in the early 2000s, 
with rising house prices and declining interest rates, a vibrant buy-to-let lending market 
developed in the United Kingdom. It is not clear at this point how stable that market will be. The 
predominant adjustable-rate mortgage lending system in the United Kingdom exposes rental 
investors to mismatch, should interest rates increase.  
Conclusions 
Next to market-oriented rent setting, the stability of investment conditions is a precondition for a 
thriving private rental market. Both corporate or institutional investment and small private 
investment can be stimulated at reasonable costs to broaden supply sources and expand the 
downward reach of the sector. 
  Key investment conditions for small private landlords are a balanced tax framework that 
allows cost deductions from rental income and netting of rental losses against other 
income as well as access to bank finance. 
  Gross rent taxes should be avoided. Access to finance for letting purposes should be 
treated within the general policy framework for the retail mortgage market. While the 
risk of rental housing finance may be higher than for owner-occupied finance, there is no 
reason for regulators to generally discourage banks from entering the sector. However, 
regulatory standards should be formulated that provide a framework for risk 
management. 
  The corporate investor market needs similar stable tax and accounting conditions; owing 
to idiosyncrasies, that may require special schemes. Corporate investors react more 
quickly to market signals than small private investors, which often face investment 
constraints. Stability of the legislative, accounting, and taxation framework is therefore 
of pivotal importance. 
  As the example of several Western European countries shows, a support strategy of 
special tax incentives for a private sector in its infancy can help mobilize new investor 
groups. If such a strategy is temporary and “sunsetted,” it will limit subsidy exposure 
(and technically be covered by the admissible state aid conditions in the EU Treaty). 
Local price elasticity conditions should be observed to ensure that subsidies flow into 
rents, rather than landowner profits.  
Institutional Requirements 
Rationale 
The implementation of rational housing policy requires a minimum infrastructure of specialized 
institutions and experts that design, formulate, implement, monitor, and independently evaluate 
policies. Those institutions should be free of conflicts of interest with, for example, the 
construction or finance industry.  
Evidence Annex 1 
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The quality of institutions is pivotal for the success of housing policies. Dübel (2004) identified 
failure to build sufficiently strong housing policy institutions and consolidate housing policy 
budgets under a single management in Central Europe as part of the cause of high housing 
subsidy costs and low program performance.  
Monitoring by creating, maintaining, and publishing a database of program costs, outputs, and 
beneficiary incidence, and supporting independent evaluation is similarly crucial to success. The 
Czech government, for example, maintains a model monitoring and communication system, 
which keeps both public and evaluating institutions abreast of housing policy trends. Similar 
high-quality systems exist in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
Where insufficient institution building is not a general problem—for example, in Western 
countries with developed institutions in the government, agency, and banking sectors—political 
conflicts of interests may reduce the effectiveness of the system. An example is the United 
States, where independent evaluators largely agree on the existence of a wasteful housing policy 
bias toward homeownership, while the political clout of both the mortgage industry and the 
homeowner lobby in the Congress precludes any significant policy change.  
The combination of low institutional capacity and high levels of conflict of interest may have 
most dramatic results: Hegedüs and Somogy (2004) describe the extreme subsidy costs of the 
Hungarian mortgage finance system, stemming from conflict of interest in a country where the 
largest mortgage lender dominates the sector and little government capacity exists to undertake 
independent formulation, implementation, and monitoring. 
A way out of this trap has been international bodies that set and enforce policy standards. In 
Europe the European Union has some, albeit limited, powers to influence mortgage market 
policies—for example, if cross-border trade is affected. However, the influence on national 
housing policies is very small, because of limitations in the EU Treaty that assign housing policy 
to the subsidiary policy ambit. Still, EU rules about state aid (Articles 88/89 of the EU Treaty) 
and relevant interpretations of the Directorate-General for competition provide valuable 
guidelines. 
Conclusion  
Transition countries should develop a minimum public, agency, and private infrastructure for 
policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. As long as housing is a priority for public 
policy, capacity in government should be adequate and independent. Also, housing-related 
subsidy budgets should be consolidated—or, at least, housing should be given formulation and 
intervention rights. Program and sector data monitoring is key and should be organized under 
housing policy. An independent evaluation capacity, ideally within the private sector, should be 
established to regularly evaluate program efficiency.  
ANNEX 2 
DESIGN OUTLINE FOR RENTAL HOUSING SURVEY 
Objectives 
The objective of the rental housing survey is to provide an analysis of supply and demand 
conditions in the rental housing sector in a given country. A particular objective is the rapid 
identification of market- or policy-induced development obstacles for the sector. The survey 
should identify follow-up work programs to encourage specific policy measures or programs, if 
necessary. 
Methodology 
The policy-oriented approach proposed requires a standardized screening format of the main 
demand and supply factors in a given market. This requires combining a variety of techniques, 
including empirical surveys and legal, financial, and microeconomic analysis.  
Prior availability of datasets crucially determines the work program that can be realized within a 
given budget constraint, especially on the demand side. Fundamental is the existence of 
disaggregated household surveys, and possibly building censuses or surveys, that provide a 
minimum of information about tenure and housing conditions. In countries that do not undertake 
such regular analyses, an ad hoc household survey covering both rental tenants and homeowners 
should be considered.  
These surveys should yield a basic understanding of age (life cycle), income, household type, 
and other standard predictive patterns of tenure. They should identify rent and housing cost 
burdens, both absolute and in relative terms between rental forms and rental and owning. Based 
on financial and housing markets parameters available, a threshold analysis to homeownership 
should be performed, to identify the share of tenants with the potential to upgrade to 
homeownership.  
On the supply side, the investor structure in residential rental assets should be identified and 
described. Investors include small private landlords, professional landlords, institutional private 
landlords, and public landlords. The supply-side analysis should especially focus on addressing 
the determinants of rental supply informality.  
The legal configuration of rental contracts and tenant-landlord relations needs attention. 
Particularly important are disclosure, formality, tenure duration, rent setting, and termination 
rules. The legal analysis should be contrasted with market practices, including in the informal 
sector. 
The taxation environment of rental housing is of special importance for stimulating formal rental 
housing supply. Together with hard rent controls, taxation presents the key obstacle to rental 
sector formality and profitability.  
The building regulation environment should be scanned for possible obstacles. It critically 
determines the profitability of investment—through capital gains mechanisms (conversion laws), 
for example, but also through general use and building type restrictions (urban planning laws) 
and transaction costs (building regulations). Also, the financial conditions for potential rental 
housing investors require discussion of the typical dimensions of liquidity risks, credit risks, and 
market risks. For instance, the market risk characteristics of refinancing rental housing Annex 2 
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investments (adjustable versus fixed-rate lending) determine which (legal) form of rent 
adjustments are feasible.  
Downstream and upstream market conditions should be assessed, such as the supply structure for 
management of rental premises (relevant for public housing), the market for development of 
apartment buildings and the land market. Policy recommendations for a comprehensive approach 
to rental housing should be made with the help of an international best practice comparison.  
Typical Tasks 
The following is a list of typical tasks, derived from earlier work of the author. 
1)   Gather stylized facts on the rental housing market (economist):  
  Tenure structure/rental housing stock: exploration of existing disaggregated 
household datasets and comparison with available tenure structure data. Description 
of tenant types and quantitative representation with the help of disaggregated datasets, 
additional surveys.  
  Market: Identification of main rental market segments and regional/urban-rural 
differentiation.  
  Prices and affordability: Assessment of rent levels, variations by location, quality, 
urban versus rural location, investor type, rent level changes over time. Assessment of 
non-rent housing and transport costs and determination of rent-to-income ratios. 
Collection of available sale prices for rental and owner-occupied units. 
  New construction of private rental housing: Construction dynamics by location, 
quality, urban versus rural location, investor types.  
  Conversion analysis: Speed and transaction costs of converting rental dwellings into 
condominiums/non-housing uses. Typical cases. 
2)   Analyze rental law and rental contracts (lawyer): 
  Tenant-landlord relationship: Form of contract, contract duration and conditions for 
termination, financial conditions, enforcement of contract. For unregulated issues: 
typical forms of contractual provisions in the formal sector.  
  Rent control/adjustment of rents: Determination of rent level in new contracts, 
adjustment in existing contracts. 
  Other applicable consumer protection and contract law. 
  Institutional environment: For contract enforcement, litigation. Assessment of cost 
and speed of litigation.   
  Empirical forms of rental agreements, including informal ones. Annex 2 
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3)   Analyze tax/subsidy and financial environment (lawyer/economist): 
  Tax treatment of rent revenues, operating and financial expenses, up-front expenses. 
One-time taxes and fees for rental property acquisition/construction. Estimation of 
taxes as a percentage of investment value and current cash flows. 
  Assessment of typical equity and debt financing instruments for rental housing 
investments (type of equity schemes, duration, financial conditions and sources of 
lending). 
  Stylized investment calculation for main investor types under the assumption of 
construction of a low-cost unit: up-front costs/initial rents and expected rental 
growth/assumptions over financing and operating costs/loan-to-value ratio, 
determination of  before and after-tax cash flows, and calculation of return on 
investment/return on equity.  
  Empirical values for typical returns, on investment and on equity, and comparison 
within a capital-asset pricing context (risk-return efficiency frontier).  
  Comparison of user costs of capital with homeownership situation 
(economic/socialized housing), and alternative investments. 
  Assessment of types/level of fiscal support needed to create a level playing field 
between rental housing investment and other investment with comparable risks (user 
costs of capital approach). 
4)   Analyze building and land regulation environment (lawyer/economist): 
  Legal analysis of conversion laws, zoning laws, building regulations, and other 
regulations concerning rental housing. Comparison with treatment of homeownership, 
public housing, commercial real estate investment.  
  Assessment of cost implications and degree of prohibitiveness of specific regulations 
and proposed reforms.  
5)   Analyze investor structures and individual support approaches (economist): 
  Financial typology under country law for the principal investor types: institutional 
investor (life insurer or property trust), individual small landlord, small 
enterprise/professional landlord, public and non-profit landlords.  
  Assessment of typical investment strategies of the principal investor types. 
Assessment of management capabilities. Identification of obstacles to investment in 
rental housing specific to principal investor types. 
  Identification and characterization of typical forms of social entrepreneurship in rental 
housing outside formal sector rental housing investment, such as cooperatives, that 
might be attracted to the sector. Annex 2 
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6)   Analyze downstream and upstream market conditions (economist): 
  Assessment of value added provided by typical rental housing investors (vertical 
integration). 
  Downstream (output) market analysis: 
-  Subletting: Empirical assessment, legal fringe conditions of market for 
subletting rental units. Typical contract conditions. Interaction with primary 
rental market conditions (rent control). 
-  Management of rental units (separation of investor and management 
function): Empirical significance and legal conditions of market. 
Characterization of supply-side or typical contract conditions. Analysis of 
potential use for public rental housing. 
  Upstream (input) market analysis:  
-  Property development: Analysis of typical building technologies, price 
structure, and competitive situation in the market. 
7)   Analyze the informal rental housing market (economist): 
  Stylized facts along the lines of 1). Size of the market in main cities. 
  Analysis of tenant-landlord relationship and the role of public sector. Impact analysis 
of existing public policy approaches. 
  Sample survey of informal dweller households: type and frequency of rental 
relationships, income/expenditure and wealth, housing costs and affordability, 
housing needs, housing preferences, and attitudes. 
8)   Identify international best practice of private rental housing (economist): 
  Successful private rental housing development strategies. 
  Successful development strategies for the informal rental housing market. 
  Analysis of private rental housing development strategies of income and regional 
comparator countries. 
  Best practice of rental housing allowances (short assessment of principle feasibility 
for the case country with the help of empirical results obtained from the parallel 
homeownership assistance study). 
Expected Survey Output 
The survey should deliver an empirically and conceptually consistent policy menu for policy 
makers: 
  The main lines of an economic development strategy for the rental sector.  Annex 2 
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  Proposal for changes or amendments to existing legislation and regulation (for 
example, on tenant-landlord relations and rent control). 
  Proposal for a fiscal support strategy for rental housing that is consistent with overall 
macroeconomic and housing policy goals. 
  Recommendations for existing public rental housing policies. Proposals for a 
differentiation of the social housing sector—for example, through PPP models or 
other.   
  Development of strategies for the informal rental housing market, or the conditions of 
its conversion into formality. 
These recommendations should be publicized in a suitable manner and presented to involved 
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